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 I 
Abstract 
The further development of economic globalisation causes the status and effect of 
economic factors to continuously increase in international relations. This new 
characteristic is increasingly apparent in cross-strait relations as the course of the 
reform and opening-up in mainland China, as well as the development of cross-strait 
economy and trade. Particularly since the mainland and Taiwan signed Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010, economic development has 
become one of the most important issues between the two sides. 
Since the détente between the mainland and Taiwan in the 1980s, cross-strait 
economics and trade have displayed two primary characteristics. First, the volume of 
trade, the amount of investment, and especially the economic interdependency 
between the two sides are all constantly increasing. Second, although under the 
influence of fluctuating political relations, the cross-strait economic relationship is 
still maintaining a stable development tendency. Due to the impact of economic 
globalisation, both the mainland and Taiwan are re-examining their own economic 
interests and have realized that economic relations form the cornerstone of their 
relationship. The expanding common interest which is generated from the deepening 
cross-strait economic exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan is becoming the 
key factor in both governments’ political considerations. Cross-strait economic and 
trade development is thus becoming an interests mechanism which maintains the 
framework of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. 
This thesis argues that cross-strait economic interdependence and cross-strait 
relations are inherently and interactively related. From the viewpoint of Neoliberalist 
Theory and Interdependent Theory, and on the basis of the development course of 
cross-strait economy and trade, this article analyzes the interactive effect between the 
cross-strait economy and cross-strait relations, especially the political relations from 
many factors such as the signing of ECFA, the impact of Taiwanese businessmen’s 
investment in the mainland, and the mainland's Taiwan policy. This thesis concludes 
that on the one hand, the increase in cross-strait economic interdependence will 
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promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, stable 
cross-strait relations will also provide a policy guarantee and a peaceful scope for the 
future development of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Taiwan Strait used to be a ―dire strait‖ because it had caused direct military 
confrontations between the People’s Republic of China (the PRC) and the United 
States of America (―US‖) during and after the Cold War. The situation across the 
Taiwan Strait is still important in international relations today because it remains a 
major flashpoint in East Asia, as one of the few unresolved problems of the Chinese 
Civil War/Cold War conflicts. It is widely agreed that the Taiwan issue originally 
stemmed from the Chinese Civil War. In the past sixty years, cross-strait relations 
have undergone a range of situations ranging from pure military confrontation to 
economic and social cooperation and interdependence, especially since the PRC 
changed its policy from liberating Taiwan by force to unifying Taiwan with the 
Chinese mainland by peaceful means. Cross-strait social and economic integration 
have become the predominant theme since 1979. However, in recent years, the 
relationship between the two sides has nevertheless experienced ups and downs, 
particularly for reasons attributable to the Taiwan independence issue.  
Changes began to take place after Ma Ying-jeou took office as the President of 
Taiwan in May 2008. Economic and social ties between the two sides have reached 
their closest point in decades since President Ma assumed office (Ide, 2010). 
Cross-strait relations have also witnessed important progress and marked a historic 
turning point, such as the achievement of the three direct links (direct air, sea and 
postal services) across the Taiwan Strait, the opening of tourism offices in Beijing and 
Taipei in May 2010, and the signing of the cross-strait Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) one month thereafter. Furthermore, mainland tourists 
are now allowed to travel to the island of Taiwan for the first time since 1949. Even 
though cross-strait political tensions still exist, economic interdependence between 
mainland China and Taiwan is developing so fast that mainland China replaced the 
United States to become Taiwan’s largest trading partner in 2003 (Lin & Yi, 2006). In 
contrast Taiwan, with an estimated one million business people and their families 
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living in the mainland (Hsiung, 2009, p.130), remains one of the most important 
investors and trading partners of the mainland. However, since Ma was elected as the 
president, the recent upsurge in the Taiwanese public attitude towards the mainland 
has led some in Taiwan to criticize President Ma’s efforts to foster economic 
rapprochement with the mainland, viewing the economic interdependence with the 
mainland as risking Taiwan’s sovereignty (EIU ViewsWire, 2010). Some even revile 
the signing of ECFA as ―a first step toward eventual unification‖ (Tsai, 2010, p.4).  
The question of whether and how economic interdependence affects states’ 
political relations is not a new topic in international relations: this theme has been 
widely studied by numerous scholars, such as Robert O. Keohane, Arthur R. Stein and 
Albert O. Hirschman. Generally speaking, liberalism expounds the positivist 
argument that ―an open international political economy, with rules and institutions 
based on state sovereignty, provides incentives for international cooperation and may 
even affect the international constitutions of states in ways that promote peace‖ 
(Koehane, 1990, p.166-167). In contrast realist scholars hold completely different 
views and argue that interdependence either increases the likelihood of war or is not 
related to its initiation. On the one hand, economic interdependence heightens the 
likelihood of war by increasing the numbers of opportunities for conflict, such as the 
trade inequality and asymmetry between states (Hirschman, 1980; Stein, 1993). On 
the other hand, interdependence is unrelated to war and other forms of military 
conflict, which is driven primarily by political and strategic concerns (Waltz, 1993; 
Holsti, 1986).  
History has played a pivotal role in the relationship between mainland China and 
Taiwan. This study begins with a brief review of the two sides’ history in the last six 
decades. Reviewing this history will enable readers to gain a better understanding of 
how the Taiwan issue arose, why it developed from pure military confrontation to the 
current social and economic interdependence and why this will lead to peace and 
stability across the Taiwan Strait. A brief review of cross-strait history in the past six 
decades will be the main focus of Chapter Two.  
Chapter Three will provide an overview of the existing literature, especially the 
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recent debates on the correlations between cross-strait economic interdependence and 
the political relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. In this chapter, the 
main arguments between realism and liberalism, including economic liberalism and 
institutionalist liberalism will become the objects of more detailed scrutiny.  
Chapter Four will focus on ECFA to explore cross-strait political relations, firstly 
introducing the detailed contents of ECFA. Secondly, a comparison of the economic 
motivations for China and the US to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) follows as this comparative research provides inspirational thinking on 
interpreting the trend of cross-strait economic relations under the mechanism of 
ECFA. Finally, this chapter applies Neoliberalism Theory and Economic 
Interdependence Theory to explore the significance of ECFA to peace and stability 
across the Taiwan Strait . 
  The next case study which is the political role of the Taiwanese business 
community in the process of cross-strait economic interdependence will be the main 
focus of Chapter Five, in which, I will cite the newest data which indicates the extent 
and the depth of the cross-strait economic and social integration which was mainly 
fueled by the Taiwanese business community’s vast investment in the mainland. 
Furthermore, I will examine the Taiwanese business community’s role in signing 
ECFA and other cross-strait agreements in the past two to three decades. Also, the 
Taiwanese people’s close and private relations with both Chinese government 
officials and the Taiwanese political parties will be explored. 
Chapter Six mainly focuses on mainland China’s new policy towards Taiwan – 
the peaceful development policy. In this chapter, it firstly analyzes the CCP 
President Hu Jintao’s speech at the conversazione held in commemoration of the 
30
th 
anniversary of the issue of the Message to Taiwan Compatriots at the end of 2008. 
Secondly, it explores the targets, political basis and method the mainland is adopting 
and the impetus for realizing cross-strait peaceful development respectively by 
expounding the mainland’s peaceful development policy towards Taiwan. 
Chapter Seven forms the overall conclusion of this thesis. It summarizes the key 
findings in the previous chapters and also answers the main argument. 
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Chapter 2 Cross-strait History Review from 1949 to Today 
Introduction  
In the past six decades, the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan has 
undergone a dramatic change from being complete enemies to close economic 
partners to one another from the period of from 1949 to the present. In this chapter, a 
brief historical review of the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan in the 
past six decades will be studied in detail. According to the social, political and 
economic changes occurring between the mainland and Taiwan, cross-strait relations 
are divided into four periods as follows. From 1949 to 1979, there was constant 
instability, conflicts and even military buildup between the mainland and Taiwan. 
From 1979 to 1993 cross-strait political contact and continuing economic growth has 
appeared. From 1994 until 2007, cross-strait relations entered into a state of being 
further economically interdependent while political tensions constantly occurred. The 
last period is from 2008 to the present in which both cross-strait economic and 
political relations started to warm up after the KMT President Ma Ying-jeou assumed 
the presidency. 
 
2.1 Cross-strait Instability and Conflicts from 1949 to 1979 
The Taiwan issue originally stems from the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, after being 
defeated by the Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek’s 
government fled mainland China for the island of Taiwan. On the 1
st
 of October, 1949, 
the PRC was founded in Beijing by Mao Zedong’s Communist Party. In that same 
year, the Republic of China (the ROC) which was governed by Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist party, also known as the Kuomintang (―KMT‖) in Cantonese or the 
Guomindang in Mandarin began to settle on the island of Taiwan and started to 
gradually develop this island economically, politically, and militarily (Smith, 2007).  
In the mainland, after the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese leaders and 
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Chinese people regarded Taiwan as their own national territory. To the Chinese people 
and government, the Taiwan issue is extremely important because it involves China’s 
territorial integrity. Due to the long history of humiliation during which China was 
treated unequally by foreign forces, the Chinese people exhibit strong emotions in 
matters concerning national independence, territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty. The PRC used the rhetoric of liberating Taiwan as the main guiding 
strategy to deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government during the period from 
1949 to 1979. A Xinhua News Editorial of March 15, 1949, titled ―Zhongguo renmin 
yiding yao jiefang Taiwan‖ [―The Chinese people certainly will liberate Taiwan‖] 
became the first official slogan to deal with the Taiwan issue (Wachman, 2007). The 
PRC leadership believed the only way to free Taiwan and to achieve a final 
reunification between Taiwan and the mainland was to fight with the United States 
and its ally - the ROC regime headed by Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT. Furthermore, 
the PRC dispatched massive military troops and equipment to Fujian Province, which 
is the closest province on the mainland to the island of Taiwan, and started shelling off 
Jinmen, Taiwan’s closest islands to the mainland, every other day. Therefore, in the 
three decades after the PRC was established, the situation across the Taiwan Strait was 
fraught with hostility, military confrontation and military build-up. An example of the 
extensive military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait is when the US dispatched 
its Seventh Fleet to safeguard Taiwan which was facing a potential PRC military 
invasion at the beginning of the outbreak of the Korean War in the early 1950s (Zhang, 
2004).  
The ensuing massive military buildup in both the mainland and Taiwan has 
caused separation, polarisation, military confrontation and instability across the 
Taiwan Strait for the three decades since 1949. The use of force also remained the 
PRC’s dominant strategy to reunify China. There were no social or economic contacts 
across the Taiwan Strait in the three decades after the PRC was established in 1949.    
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2.2 The Emergence of Cross-strait Political Contact and Continuing Growth of 
Cross-Strait Economic and Social Communication from 1979 to 1993 
The late 1970s marked a historical turning point in the PRC’s history because the year 
1978 brought the inception of mainland China’s economic and political reforms. 
Changes across the Taiwan Strait also began to take place after the PRC leader Deng 
Xiaoping came to power in 1978. The mainland started sending new signals to its 
Taiwanese compatriots and shifted its attitude towards Taiwan away from ―liberation 
by force‖ and towards ―peaceful unification‖. On January 1st, 1979, the PRC 
announced the end to every-other-day shelling of Jinmen and forwarded the famous 
Message to Taiwan Compatriots. This was the first time since 1949 that the PRC had 
sought to bring the cross-strait military confrontation to an end and expressed a wish 
for three links and expanded communications across the Taiwan Strait (Wu, 1995, 
p.20). Furthermore, in the early 1980s, the PRC leader Deng Xiaoping formulated the 
―one country, two systems‖ policy as the guideline for reunifying China peacefully. 
This policy suggested that there would only be one China in the world, but 
independent Chinese regions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, could still 
maintain their capitalist economic, judicial, financial and political systems, while the 
rest of China upheld the socialist system. In the Taiwan case, the PRC suggested that 
after the reunification of China, Taiwan would remain as highly autonomous and 
democratic as before (Song, Wang & Sun, 2011).  
In Taiwan, the late 1970s also marked a historical turning point. Economically, 
Taiwan has transformed from cheap, labor-intensive manufacturing industry into more 
export-oriented competitive industry, such as infrastructure, advanced electronics and 
heavy industry. Taiwan’s export-oriented economy grew so fast that in the late 1970s 
it had become one of the Four Asian Tigers along with South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Politically, the KMT still remained the only legitimate ruling party in 
Taiwan and martial law was still enforced in Taiwanese society (Roy, 2003). 
Diplomatically, in December 1978 the US formally transferred its diplomatic relations 
and recognition from the ROC government in Taiwan to the PRC (Wachman, 2007). 
From then on, Taiwan started to suffer a period of isolation by major powers and 
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international organizations. In response to the shift of the PRC’s Taiwan policy from 
military liberation to peaceful reunification, Chiang Ching-kuo’s KMT government in 
Taiwan responded negatively and outlined what came to be known as the ―Three Nos‖ 
policy – no contact, no compromise, and no negotiations with the mainland (Johnston 
& Ross, 1999).    
However, Taiwan Society in the 1980s had undergone a dramatic change. 
Politically, the society of Taiwan became more and more democratic especially after 
the termination of martial law in 1987 (Johnston & Ross, 1999, p.61). Economically, 
people in Taiwan were becoming increasingly wealthier. In 1986, there were a group 
of senior mainland veterans which were brought to Taiwan by the KMT after Chiang 
Kai-shek lost mainland China to the Chinese Communist Party (the CCP), began to 
ask for permission to visit their family in the mainland after four decades of 
separation across the Taiwan Strait. The mainland veterans’ campaign gained massive 
support from Taiwan public, including some open-minded KMT members and some 
DPP legislators. Under such heavy pressure from society, the KMT had little choice 
but to lift its ban and allow Taiwanese people to visit the mainland (Hsiao & So, 
1996).  
From the moment Taiwanese were allowed to visit the mainland, a large number 
of people from Taiwan visited mainland China for tourism and other civil purposes. 
Statistics show that from 1988 to 1993, people from Taiwan made more than five 
million visits to the mainland (Mainland Affairs Council, 2003). Due to the affinities 
of language, culture and the geographic closeness, massive Taiwanese investments to 
the Chinese eastern coastline followed after their visits to the mainland. In 1990 
Taiwan had already become the number two investor in Mainland China, surpassing 
even the United States and Japan (Hsiao & So, 1996, p.3). Cross-strait trade also grew 
dramatically from 1979 to 1993. In particular, in the year 1984, 1985 and 1993, 
cross-strait economic trade in total increased by 123%, 99.1% and 94.3% respectively. 
Statistic shows, the mainland’s usage of Taiwanese investment in reality increased 
more than 100% in the period from 1991 to 1993 (Lin & Yi, 2006, p.10).  
The massive civil-society contacts across Taiwan strongly undermined the KMT’s 
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―Three Nos‖ policy. Institutionally, in the beginning of the 1990s, the Taiwan 
government established different organisations in order to better deal with the 
increasing cross-strait social and economic exchanges. On 21 September 1990, 
President Lee Teng-hui established the National Unification Council (the NUC) to 
draft and amend a new China policy (Chao & Myers, 2000, p.21). On 28 January 
1991, the NUC devised a three-phase process embodied in the National Unification 
guidelines calling for China’s reunification. In the first phase, the two sides across the 
Taiwan Strait should denounce the use of force in dealing with cross-strait affairs, 
enlarge cross-strait nonofficial, social exchanges, and respect each other’s jurisdiction 
within their territories. In the second phase, official communication should be 
established following the mutual understanding and trust built through massive social 
contact across the Taiwan Strait. At this stage, the three direct links (direct air, sea 
links and direct postal service) could be allowed and high-ranking officials from both 
sides could then visit each other. In the third and final phase, the two sides across the 
Taiwan Strait could set up different institutions to discuss and facilitate the eventual 
reunification of a democratic, free, and prosperous China (Chao & Myers, 2000). 
Furthermore, in February 1991, the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) was 
established in Taipei to deal with the increasing cross-strait social and economic 
affairs (Yahuda, 1993). Beijing soon established a counterpart organization to the SEF 
which is the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in 
December 1991 (Johnston & Ross, 1999). Beginning in November 1991, 
representatives of these two institutions met and discussed some historical and 
economic issues. An oral agreement which was known as the ―1992 consensus‖ came 
to fruition in November 1992 in the meeting between the SEF and ARATS held in 
Hong Kong. In the ―1992 consensus‖, both the mainland and Taiwan representatives 
agreed to adhere to the ―One China Principle‖ and committed itself to work toward 
unification even though the two sides had their own interpretation thereof (Ling, 
2002).    
To sum up, in the period from 1979 to 1993, the PRC’s policy towards Taiwan 
became much less confrontational than it had been during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Peaceful unification and the ―one country, two systems‖ policy took up the dominant 
elements in the PRC’s strategy towards Taiwan. Cross-strait economic relations 
started and strengthened from the early 1980s following Taiwan’s robust investment 
in the mainland. Since the early 1990s, more than half of Taiwanese outside 
investment is to mainland China (Chung, 2008). Also around this time, social and 
economic relations across the Taiwan Strait started to grow dramatically. In order to 
deal with the daily increasing cross-strait social and economic exchanges, the SEF 
and ARATS were established in Taipei and Beijing respectively. These two 
institutions were staffed by government officials and their formal meetings and 
negotiations also marked the emergence of cross-strait political contact.   
 
2.3 Ongoing Cross-Strait Political Tensions from 1994 to 2007 and Deepening 
Economic Interdependence between the Mainland and Taiwan  
The year 1994 began with signs of a possible thaw in cross-strait political relations 
when Lee Teng-hui’s support of Taiwan’s separation from China came to light. In an 
interview with a Japanese writer, Ryotaro Shiba, Lee openly expressed his ―grief at 
being Taiwanese‖ and compared himself to Moses leading the children of Israel out of 
bondage. He also described the KMT as an ―alien‖ regime (Hickey, 1999). 
Furthermore, in April 1995, Lee demanded that Beijing should accept the reality of 
two separate Chinese governments in his own ―Six Principles‖ (Roy, 2003). Lee’s 
provocative remarks outraged the mainland, which started to denounce Lee as a 
separatist and charged him with orchestrating a Taiwan independence movement. For 
the mainland, Lee’s visit to the US and his speech as Head of State at Cornell 
University was the final straw. Beijing considered Lee to be taking advantage of the 
mainland’s conciliatory posture and trying to promote Taiwan independence. 
Therefore, from July 1995 to March 1996, the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA) 
began test-firing missiles into the waters off Taiwan’s coast. The PLA also engaged  
in naval exercises and its largest amphibious exercises in the Taiwan Strait. The 
mainland’s military exercises were considered a coercive response to Lee’s betrayal of 
the one China principle. However, the US decision to dispatch its aircraft carrier, the 
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Nimitz to pass through the Taiwan Strait and the Clinton administration’s 
announcement to further deploy another aircraft carrier Independence together with 
the supporting ships to international waters near Taiwan, brought the third Taiwan 
Strait crisis to its non-confrontational climax (Roy, 2003). 
 In 1996 Taiwan’s first presidential election was underway, and many felt that one 
aspect of the mainland’s military exercises so close to the Taiwan Strait was to affect 
the Taiwanese people’s voting behaviour. As Lee’s political opponent Chen Li-an 
asserted, ―If you vote for Lee Teng-hui, you are choosing war‖, nevertheless the first 
presidential election still achieved great success when Lee Teng-hui became Taiwan’s 
first popularly-elected president (Roy, 2003, p.199). However, during Lee’s second 
term of presidency, he was not less provocative towards the mainland than he was in 
his first. In an interview with Deutsche Welle [German Wave], Lee Teng-hui described 
cross-strait relations as a ―state to state relationship‖ or ―at least a special state to state 
relationship‖; this was known as ―two states theory‖ (Lee, 1999, p.26-33). Again, 
Beijing was infuriated by Lee’s anti-reunification actions and suspended dialogues 
between the SEF and ARATS (Zagoria & Fugarino, 2003, p.115). This time, the attack 
from Beijing was mainly verbal, rather than in the form of military exercises. For 
example, immediately after Lee Teng-hui’s ―two states‖ remarks, the mainland’s 
major media reports and academic articles all denounced and criticized Lee as a 
―betrayer‖ and a ―separatist‖ of the Chinese motherland, the definite failure of his 
conspiracy, and Lee himself would be punished by Chinese history (China News, 
2000; Hai, 1999).  
 Lee Teng-hui’s political career ended in 2000 when his successor Chen Shui-bian, 
a Democratic Progress Party (the DPP) leader, was elected president of Taiwan. 
However, the DPP is the dominant party in the pan-green camp and it has been 
traditionally associated with a strong advocacy of a Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese 
independence. Chen was also widely considered a resolute supporter of pro-Taiwan 
independence movement. In 2002 Chen not only devised the ―Two Countries - Taiwan 
and the Mainland - One On Each Side Theory‖, but also demanded legislation to 
enable a ―referendum‖ on Taiwan’s future (Huang, Zhuang, Huang, Liu, Yu & Liu, 
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2002). As mentioned above, the Taiwan issue is of significant import to the mainland 
as it involves China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Therefore, the 
mainland government’s attitude towards Taiwan is considered determined and 
entrenched. In response to Chen’s anti-reunification remarks and the DPP’s 
pro-independence actions, in 2005 the PRC enacted an anti-secession law asserting 
that it would unquestionably resort to "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan were to declare 
formal independence (People’s Daily, 2005). The legalization of the mainland’s ―use 
of force‖ to achieve unification did not stop Chen’s provocative actions towards the 
PRC. In 2007, Chen declared ―four demands and one without‖, which indicated 
―Taiwan demands independence, Taiwan demands to change its official name from 
the ROC to Taiwan, Taiwan demands a new constitution, Taiwan demands 
development and there is no middle way, only a question of reunification with the 
mainland or Taiwan independence‖ (Zhang, 2007). Like Lee Teng-hui, Chen 
Shui-ban’s anti-unification remarks and his support for the promotion of Taiwan 
independence caused ongoing cross-strait political tensions during his presidency 
from 2000 to early 2008.  
 Unlike the constant political tensions between the mainland and Taiwan, 
cross-strait economic and social integration dramatically deepened during the period 
from 1994 to early 2008. According to the 2002 Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 
statistics, cross-strait trade was around $40 billion (Fu, 2008, p.143). Two years later 
in 2004, cross-strait trade quickly doubled, reaching $78.3 billion (Lin & Yi, 2006, 
p.5). Again in 2007, bilateral trade between the mainland and Taiwan reached $124.5 
billion (Zhu, 2008, p.34). Taiwan’s robust investment in the mainland is another 
example of fast growing cross-strait economic integration. From the year 1990 to 
2004, the average increase rate of Taiwan’s investment to mainland China was 29.1% 
(Lin & Yi, 2006). According to the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, as of 2006, 
mainland China had approved 71,847 Taiwanese investment projects on the mainland 
in total and the contracts they signed involved $101 billion from the Taiwan side. 
Taiwanese investment in the mainland in 2006 also accounted for 70% of Taiwan’s 
total foreign investment programmes approved by the government that year. Due to 
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the ever-increasing economic ties, Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland 
also grew year by year. In 2001, Taiwan’s export dependence on the mainland was 
17%, while in 2006, it immediately grew to 40% (Cao, 2008). In terms of the social 
communications between the two sides, by the end of 2007, the number of Taiwanese 
people visiting the mainland was larger than 47 million. To take 2007 for example, 
due to the daily increasing social and economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, 
more than 4.6 million Taiwanese people – this is one sixth of Taiwan’s total 
population - visited the mainland for tourism, education, health, physical culture, 
media and economic activities (Zhang, 2009).   
 In sum, cross-strait political relations deteriorated dramatically between 1994 and 
2007 due to Taiwanese leaders, such as the anti-unification and pro-Taiwan 
independence actions of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. As a consequence, there 
were ongoing cross-strait political tensions between the two sides in the period from 
1994 to 2007. However, at the same time, cross-strait economic and social integration 
further deepened dramatically notwithstanding their ongoing political tensions.  
 
2.4 The Ease of Cross-strait Political Tensions and Continuing Economic 
Integration between the Mainland and Taiwan since the KMT President Ma 
Ying-jeou Came to Power in May 2008 
The year 2008 began with a positive sign in cross-strait relations when the KMT 
candidate Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan. Being different from the 
DPP, the KMT is the dominant party in the pan-blue camp and it supports eventual 
unification with the mainland. In order to ease cross-strait political tensions and repair 
their relationship, the KMT government showed a positive posture towards further 
economic and social integration with the mainland. Therefore, one month after Ma 
assumed the presidency, semi-official dialogues between the SEF and ARATS were 
resumed after the previous nine years’ suspension (Zagoria & Fugarino, 2003, p.115). 
Some milestone progress were attained, such as the achievement of three direct links, 
the lifted ban of mainland tourism travel to Taiwan,, and the signing of the cross-strait 
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Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). The following few 
paragraphs will talk about these recent cross-strait achievements in detail.  
In the past, if Taiwanese travellers planed to visit mainland China, they had to 
transfer to a separate flight at an intermediate location, usually Hong Kong or Macau, 
before flying on to mainland cities. This unnecessary transfer not only wasted 
travelers’ time, but also squandered extra money on fuel, especially when the 
destination cities lay in northern China. For example, a glance at a map shows that the 
mainland China city of Beijing lies to the northwest of Taipei; however passengers 
from Taipei first had to fly southwestward to Hong Kong before travelling northward 
to their final destination. This detour extended the trip to at least 1.4 times over the 
shortest route between the two cities (Chung, 2008). On June 13, 2008, Chiang 
Pin-kung, Chairman of the SEF, and his mainland counterpart Chen Yunlin, Chairman 
of the ARATS, met in Beijing and signed agreements to allow direct charter passenger 
flights across the Taiwan Strait on a regular basis (Chung, 2008), which was to say 
every weekend from Friday to Monday. However, due to the rapid economic growth 
and integration across the Taiwan Strait, daily direct flights have become the pressing 
demand of people from both sides. Following the meetings between the SEF and 
ARATS in November 2008, daily direct cross-strait charter flight service began one 
month after the two sides’ dialogues (State Department Documents, 2010).  
As the result of four rounds of negotiations between the SEF and ARATS, in 
December 2008, the mainland and Taiwan finally ended the fifty-nine year long ban 
on direct air and sea transport and postal services. The goal of ―three direct links‖ 
across the Taiwan Strait was finally achieved. Nowadays, a total of 270 regular flights 
service 31 mainland cities every week (Chung, 2010), not only greatly saving 
passengers’ time and costs, but also shortening the distance across the Taiwan Strait. 
SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung described the three direct links as being like 
―highways‖ (Wang, 2010, p.147) connecting Taiwan and the mainland. Travelling 
between the mainland and Taiwan is now so convenient that, the dream Jianwei Wang 
has described as ―having breakfast in Taiwan, lunch in Shanghai, dinner in Xiamen, 
and returning to Taiwan for a midnight snack‖ is becoming reality (Wang, 2010, 
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p.147-48 ).  
The convenience of cross-strait flights has not only shortened the distance 
between Taiwan and the mainland, but also promoted the tourist industry in Taiwan. 
As one of the agreements between the SEF and ARATS, Taiwan has opened its tourist 
market to mainland travellers since July 2008 (Gu, 2010). Today mainland tourists’ 
flock to the island in robust numbers and a wide range of economic ties are budding 
between the two sides (Carpenter, 2010). According to Taiwan government statistics, 
mainland tourists’ arrivals in Taiwan have swelled to up to 3,400 per day (Jonathan, 
2010), comparing this with the number of mainland tourists in 2008, which was just 
55,000 in total, which indicates the rate of increase in that period. The mainland, with 
1.3billion people, has the largest population of any nation in the world and its people 
wax richer daily as a result as the three decades of economic reforms. Cross-strait 
survey statistics show that more than 70% of mainlanders wish to visit Taiwan (Gu, 
2010). Due to mainland China’s large population, the mainland’s potential 
contribution to Taiwan’s tourism industry is promising. Not surprisingly, some 
scholars have predicted that the mainland is likely to become Taiwan’s top destination 
for visitors and travellers after Taiwan’s tourism market opened to mainland visitors 
(Wang, Sun & Zheng, 2010). In order to meet the growing needs of the tourism 
industry, the mainland and Taiwan opened tourism offices in Beijing and Taipei 
respectively in May, 2010. This event marked the first official presence on both sides 
of the Taiwan Straits since the two went their separate ways during the 1949 Civil War 
(Ide, 2010). Although the functions of the tourism offices are to promote travel and 
cultural exchanges, the offices in Beijing and Taipei are staffed mainly by government 
officials. Thus the opening of tourism offices by the two sides is seen as a very 
positive development and symbolic of mutual efforts to strive towards peace and 
compromise. 
In order to meet the highly rapid economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, 
on June 29
th
, 2010, ECFA was signed between the mainland and Taiwan in Chongqing 
(The Economist, 2010). According to President Ma, for Taiwan to sign ECFA with the 
mainland to relax cross-strait trade regulations and reduce tariffs, and complete an 
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industry upgrade to build an innovation-based economy, a "Golden Decade" of 
sustained development would become an attainable goal for Taiwan (BBC, 2010). 
According to the Taiwanese government, ECFA will prevent Taiwan’s economic 
marginalisation. Currently, Taiwan is recognized by only twenty-three nation states. 
The states which recognise Taiwan are considered peripheral and usually highly 
dependent on Taiwanese foreign aid (Fu, 2008). Without formal diplomatic 
relationships with the major economic countries, Taiwan has been excluded from a 
recent spate of free-trade agreements (FTAs). A closer examination of ECFA and its 
impacts on both cross-strait economic and political relations will be studied together 
with the theory of institutional liberalism in Chapter Two of this research paper.  
Like the rapid economic improvements between the mainland and Taiwan, their 
political relationship has also turned a historical corner point since Ma Ying-jeou 
assumed office. Take the KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan and the General 
Secretary of the CCP Hu Jintao for example: in order to re-initiate the two sides’ 
economic negotiations, Lien Chan made three trips to the mainland, in 2008, 2009, 
and 2010, respectively. He met with Hu Jintao each time. Some constructive 
principles and guidelines in terms of closer cross-strait economic and political ties 
were further established. Other political leaders from both sides have also made a 
show of mutual trust towards one other. PRC Premier Wen Jiabao uttered his 
cherished wish to visit the island of Taiwan one day and asserted that 5,000 years of 
shared culture and history may not be swept away by mere ―political developments‖ 
over the past 60 years. ―Squabbles between brothers do not sever blood bonds. I know 
we will reconcile our differences,‖ Wen told a press conference at the end of China's 
annual parliamentary session (Edmonton Journal, 2010). Referring to the close 
economic and social ties subsisting between the mainland and Taiwan, President Ma 
also said "We should cherish the fact that the two sides [the KMT and the CCP], 
which have fought each other for decades, are finally able to work on building mutual 
trust" (BBC, 2010). Furthermore, on 9
th
 May, 2009, Ma Ying-jeou granted an 
interview to a Singaporean morning paper, in which he clearly announced that, if he 
could win the Taiwan presidential election in 2012, there would be a ―pressing need 
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for negotiations‖, he ―would not rule out  political talks and negotiations between the 
mainland and Taiwan‖ (Taihainet, 2009).  
In conclusion, cross-strait relations have witnessed important progress since 
President Ma Ying-jeou assumed office in May 2008. Economically, the achievement 
of three direct links, the lifting of the ban on mainland tourists’ travel to Taiwan, and 
the signing of ECFA indicates the deepening economic integration and 
interdependence between the mainland and Taiwan. Politically, the cross-strait 
relationship has overcome its air of previous political tension created by the 
secessionist activities of former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP 
government. Since May 2008, both the current Taiwan’s ruling party, the KMT, and 
the CCP leaders have shown conciliatory and positive postures towards one another.  
 
Summary  
To sum up, cross-strait relations have undergone four periods of development as 
follows. The time from 1949 to 1979 was the era of military confrontation period 
between mainland China and Taiwan. There was no political, economic and social 
contact between people across the Taiwan Strait. From 1979 to 1993, cross-strait 
political contact emerged with the mainland’s issuing of the Message to Taiwan 
Compatriots as a turning point in the mainland’s policy towards Taiwan. Also in this 
period, cross-strait economic and social communication started to grow significantly. 
In the period from 1994 to 2007, cross-strait political relations deteriorated 
dramatically due to Taiwanese leaders, such as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian 
engaging in anti-unification and pro-Taiwan independence actions. At the same time, 
cross-strait economic and social integration further deepened dramatically 
notwithstanding their ongoing political tensions. The fourth period spans the time 
since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou assumed office in May 2008 to today, in which 
the cross-strait economic and political relationship has witnessed a historical 
milestone with the rapid economic improvements between the mainland and Taiwan, 
the realization of the three direct links, the achievement of the authorisation for 
mainland’s tourists to travel to Taiwan and the signing of ECFA. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review: Realism, Liberalism and 
Interdependent Theory with Cross-strait Relations  
Introduction 
As mentioned previously in Chapter One, the study of whether and how economic 
interdependence affects states’ political relations is not a new topic in international 
relations. After a brief review of the existing literature, it is obvious that liberalism 
and realism hold different views towards whether economic interdependence leads to 
peace or conflict. This chapter begins with a general review of the literature of 
contrasting realism and liberalism. In particular, the following few sections will 
summarise and critique some theories, such as classical/structural realism, 
neoliberalism and interdependence.  
 
3.1 Classical & Structural Realism with Cross-strait Relations 
Classical realism has a long historical and philosophical tradition. Its thoughts can be 
traced back to 2,500 years ago. Early classical realist thinkers, such as Thucydides, 
Niccolo Machiavelli, Carl von Clausewitz, and Hans J. Morgenthau were concerned 
with questions such as power, order, justice and change at the domestic and 
international levels (Lebow, 2007, p.53). Classical realist ideology in general is based 
on the view that individuals/states are primarily selfish and power seeking. The 
realists believe that the international system is anarchic and there is no authoritative 
hierarchy. The nature of an anarchic international system derives originally from 
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, wherein Hobbes describes states within international 
anarchy are ―having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another‖ 
(Hobbes, 1968, p.187). In the classical realist world, states operate in a self-help 
world as there is generally no higher authority they can turn to if they are threatened. 
Therefore, states have to rely on themselves to safeguard their security. One of the 
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main goals of states is survival. To the realist, the key subject of international politics 
is power. This idea appears in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War in which 
Thucydides strongly emphasized the importance of pursuing power ―the strong do 
what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept‖ 
(Thucydides, 1972, p.42). After World War II another important classical realist 
scholar was Hans J. Morgenthau. His textbook Politics among Nations: the Struggle 
for Power and Peace was described by Karen A. Mingst as ―the realist Bible for the 
years following World War II‖ (Mingst, 2008, p.65). For Morgenthau, world politics 
is a struggle for power, and the balance of power has contradictory implications for 
peace. It may not only deter war, but also intensify tensions and make war more likely 
under different circumstances based on the power struggle between the status quo 
powers and the rising challengers (Morgenthau, 1973).  
In the late 1970s, realist theory underwent a supplementary development when 
Kenneth Waltz devised the theory of structural realism which is also widely referred 
to as neorealism. Consistent with the theory of classical realism, structural realism 
also holds the view that world politics are dominated by power and the international 
system is anarchy. However, structural realists believe that the structure or 
architecture of the international system is the most important unit from which to study 
world politics and it affects the likelihood of war. Structural realists argue that the 
polarity of the system, when balanced or imbalanced induces a power shift within the 
international system, has the greatest influence on the prospect of war between states 
(Mearsheimer, 2007, p.78-82). Structural realism also believes that the possibility of 
international cooperation is slim because of the potentially uneven distribution of 
benefits among participating states. In the book Theory of International Politics, 
Kenneth Waltz describes the situation in which when the possibility of cooperation for 
mutual gain appears between states, instead of asking ―Will both of us gain?‖, states 
are more interested in ―Who will gain more?‖. If an expected gain is divided unevenly, 
the state that gains more will use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy 
intended to damage or destroy the other. Because of the fear of how the other will use 
its increased capabilities, states hesitate to cooperate even though the potential gain 
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through cooperation is promising (Waltz, 1979, p.105).  
To relate realist theory with cross-strait relations, one argues that it is outdated 
and cannot explain the current situation across the Taiwan Strait. Firstly, both classical 
realism and structural realism are power-seeking. From their perspective, cross-strait 
relations are power-based and the more Taiwan’s economy depends on mainland 
China, the more severe threat the mainland can pose to Taiwan’s national security (see 
Leng, 1998 & Friedberg, 1993). However, this approach is limited because it only 
focuses on the military and political contribution to a nation’s national power, but 
omits the importance of economic forces. Therefore, the realist theory which mainly 
focuses on the military and political areas fails to expand on the current cross-strait 
relationship which can be defined as deeper economic and social integration with the 
emergence of political contacts. Secondly, based on international anarchy and states’ 
pursuit of absolute/maximal gain, structural realism deems that there is only a limited 
chance for international cooperation. However, recent development across the Taiwan 
Strait such as ECFA - a conduct of mutual cooperation between SEF and the ARATS - 
works very well between the mainland and Taiwan. Cross-strait agreements, such as 
ECFA, show that institutions and organisations can work between the two sides and 
that also poses another challenge to structural realism. The next few sections will take 
a closer look at some liberal theories and discuss how the liberal theories can be 
applied to cross-strait relations.  
 
3.2 Neoliberalism with Cross-strait Relations 
Neoliberalism which developed from the early 1980s (Martin, 2007, p.110) is a 
relatively new theory in international relations. Stephen D. Krasner’s edited a book 
titled International Regimes (Krasner, 1983) and Robert O. Keohane’s book After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy (Keohane, 1984) marked 
the emergence of neolibearalist theory. For the neoliberal theory and neoliberals, the 
central focuses in world politics are international organizations and institutions. 
Neoliberalism is also referred to as neoliberal insitutionalism. This thesis will use the 
term neoliberalism, but this does not indicate any differences between the two labels. 
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Similar to realist theories, neoliberalism also argues that world politics are in a 
state of anarchy. However, cooperative international arrangements can be achieved 
through coordination and collaboration between states. Why do states choose to 
cooperate in an anarchic international system? Neoliberalist scholars use the 
prisoner’s dilemma to prove that it is in an individual state’s self-interest to achieve 
cooperation. The prisoner’s dilemma is a concept of game theory about two prisoners 
who are arrested by the police. Because the police have insufficient evidence for a 
conviction, both of the prisoners are separated in different rooms and interrogated 
separately for an alleged crime. The interrogator tells each prisoner that if one of them 
confesses and the other does not, the one who confessed will go free and the other 
who kept silent will get a long prison term. If both confess, both will get reduced 
prison terms. If neither confesses, both will receive short prison terms because of the 
lack of evidence. What will the prisoners choose to do? Obviously both prisoners will 
try to maximize their advantage by cooperating with or betraying the other player. 
Let’s imagine if both prisoners confess, thus each of them will serve a longer sentence 
than if both of them cooperated and kept silent. It is a difficult decision for each 
prisoner to make because neither knows how the other will respond (Mingst, 2008, 
p.61-62). The prisoner’s dilemma is important in neoliberalist theory as it reveals two 
facts in international relations. Firstly, one of the most important reasons why states 
choose to cooperate is because of mutual benefit, known as reciprocity. Robert O. 
Keohane has mentioned in his book After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Economy that ―reciprocity seems to be the most effective strategy for 
maintaining cooperation among egoists‖ (Keohane, 1984, p.214). Secondly, the 
prisoner’s dilemma in international relations reveals the fact that the impediments of 
international cooperation do not constitute international anarchy itself, but individual 
states’ behaviour of cheating, reneging on the terms of trade agreements, and the 
misunderstanding of information. According to a neoliberalist scholar, Arthur A. Stein, 
international cooperation can be achieved through institution-building which can 
specify and distinguish states’ behaviours between cooperation and cheating (Stein, 
1983). In order to pursue mutual interests, states’ efforts of coordination and 
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collaboration will slowly have the effect of driving the emergence of international 
institutions.  
International institutions are defined as ―a set of rules and stipulate the ways in 
which states should cooperate and compete with each other. [International institutions] 
prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviours, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of 
behaviours‖ (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995, p.8). Even though international institutions do 
not rise to the level of a form of world government, states must choose to obey the 
rules if they wish to gain mutual benefits from joining international institutions. 
Scholar John J. Mearsheimer summarised four reasons why international institutions 
can produce cooperation among states. Firstly rules within institutions can increase 
the number of transactions between states over time. The institutionalised iteration 
creates a situation in which the cost of cheating today becomes so high that the 
potential future punishment will occur in the future cooperation. Therefore, 
international institutions have a role of discouraging state’s cheating behaviour. 
Secondly, international institutions create a situation in which interactions between 
states are in different issue areas. States become reluctant to cheat in one issue area 
because they fear that the victim and other states will retaliate in another issue area. 
Thirdly, the structure of international institutions increases the amount of information 
available to cooperating states so that close monitoring becomes possible. Institutions 
can perform monitoring functions and can provide assurance that other states are 
obeying the terms of their commitments. Fourthly, rules within institutions can reduce 
the transaction costs of individual agreements. Therefore, international institutions 
become more profitable and more attractive for self-interested states (Mearsheimer, 
1994-1995).  
To relate neoliberalism with cross-strait relations, one argues that 
neoliberalist’s focus on institutions can best explain recent cross-strait relations as it 
suitably reflects the experience of cross-strait relationship in the past three decades. In 
particular, the establishment of two semi-official organisations – SEF and ARATS – in 
the beginning of 1990s marked the emergence of cross-strait cooperation and the 
institution-building process. Cross-strait institution building in the early 1990s is an 
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important event because through negotiations between SEF and ARATS, there is more 
information available for both sides. Having an institutional channel to contact the 
other side across the Taiwan Strait, clear information exchanges between both the 
mainland and Taiwan become facilitated.  Therefore, misunderstanding between 
them can possibly become avoidable. In this sense, cooperation between the mainland 
and Taiwan becomes possible and efficient. As mentioned in Chapter Two, in order to 
soften cross-strait political tension, the ―1992 consensus" was achieved between the 
SEF and ARATS negotiations. Furthermore, after the KMT came back to power again 
in 2008, the achievement of the Three Direct Links and ECFA further proves that 
cooperation between the mainland and Taiwan can be efficiently achieved through 
negotiations and institutions. Chapter Four will offer a closer examination of ECFA 
between the mainland and Taiwan, and shall explore the functions of institutions 
between the two sides.  
 
3.3 Interdependence Theory with Cross-strait Relations  
Interdependence theory is a relatively new theory and an important element in the 
theory of liberalism. In Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s book Power and 
Interdependence, the authors firstly explicitly assert the fact that ―we live in an era of 
interdependence‖ (Keohane & Nye, 1989, p.3). Then Keohane and Nye point out that 
interdependence as an analytic concept can be most simply defined as mutual 
dependence. In order to understand the role of power and interdependence, Keohane 
and Nye also point out two important dimensions of interdependence, which are 
sensitivity and vulnerability (Keohane & Nye, 1989). According to Susan M. 
McMillan, ―sensitivity is the extent to which one country is affected by the actions of 
another, whereas vulnerability is the extent to which a country can insulate itself from 
the costly effects of events that occur elsewhere‖ (McMillan, 1997, p.34). In world 
politics, interdependence refers to a situation characterised by reciprocal effects 
among countries or among actors in different countries. Another scholar David A. 
Baldwin’s definition of interdependence refers to an ―international relationship that 
would be costly to break‖ (Baldwin, 1980, p.484); this is similar to Keohane and 
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Nye’s idea.  
In international relations, the study of interdependence shows that economic 
interdependence has the positive effect of reducing conflict between trading partners 
and leading them to peace and stability. The liberal argument that connected economic 
interdependence with less war is based on the idea that international commerce 
restrains individual state’s passion for conquest. In the book The Passions and the 
Interests, Albert O. Hirschman argues that ―international commerce, being a 
transaction between nations, could conceivably have also a direct impact on the 
likelihood of peace and war: once again the [economic] interest might overcome the 
passions, specifically the passion for conquest‖ (Hirschman, 1977, p.79). Some other 
liberal scholars such as Peter Cain, Richard Rosecrance, and John Mueller’s approach 
to how and why economic interdependence leads to peace between states is worthy of  
investigation. The next few sections of this chapter will summarise some ideas of 
interdependence theory and briefly relate it to cross-strait relations.  
 As mentioned above, interdependence theory is a newly-developed strand of 
liberalist theory. In terms of the relationship between economic activities and the 
result of war, liberalism in general makes the positivist argument that ―an open 
international political economy, with rules and institutions based on state sovereignty, 
provides incentives for international cooperation and may even affect the international 
constitutions of states in ways that promote peace‖ (Koehane, 1990, p.166-167). The 
theory of interdependence proposes that economic interdependence decreases 
international conflict, or at least decreases incentives for conflicts. Among the theories, 
divergent causal arguments between interdependence and peace coexist. This chapter 
will discuss three casual mechanisms, known as the cost-benefit mode, the free trade 
mechanism and the sociological model.   
Richard Rosecrance devised the cost-benefit model to analyze the relationship 
between economic interdependence and conflict. According to Rosecrance, a liberal 
open economy is a prerequisite to increased trade. As trade increases in a system and 
interdependence grows, the initiation of war becomes a relatively costly way for states 
to pursue their interests. Within the system of high interdependence, trading states 
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realise they can improve their national power more easily through commerce in the 
international market rather than through military expansion. In other words, in the 
world of interdependence, economic means can be more effective than military ones 
in achieving a given purpose. Therefore, high interdependence will lead to peace 
because trade brings more benefits to a state than invasion. In this book The Rise of 
the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, Richard Rosecrance 
reveals the trend towards trading worlds rather than a military-political world. In 
order to prosper, nations need to shift in the direction of new trading strategies 
(Rosecrance, 1986, p.212-214).  
Another causal argument between interdependence and the reduction of war is 
from the free trade mechanism. In Peter Cain’s work Capitalism, War and 
Internationalism in the Thought of Richard Cobden, Cain summarises two ways free 
trade helps end warfare between states. Firstly, free trade helps by undermining the 
income and position of the ruling landlord class. Without financial support, aristocrats 
are unable to mount a possible and effective military fight. Secondly, free trade 
creates a situation in which states are connected through a high level of trade, capital 
flows and there is an international division of labour. Within the system of high 
interdependence, states are unlikely to go to war against each other because they 
recognise that their own wealth and prosperity depend on others. Economic 
interdependence helps to promote peace because the disruption of commercial ties by 
war will not serve a state’s national interest (Cain, 1979, p.233-239).  
Another causal argument between interdependence and peace comes from the 
sociological model, scholar Ronald Rogowski’s new coalition building idea and John 
Mueller’s social and cultural evolution process. Ronald Rogowski argues that 
interdependence facilitates sociocultural evolution between trading states. Closer 
economic ties will generate new coalitions with different international goals. If 
economic interdependence is intensive, these new coalitions will grow larger and will 
have the ability to influence state goals (Rogowski, 1989). In the book Retreat from 
Doomsday: the Obsolescence of Major War, John Mueller emphasises the importance 
of sociocultural evolution for reducing international conflict. Mueller summarises the 
  25 
process by which war is abandoned by people. In the first stage of the process of 
social and cultural evolution, war is rejected because it’s calculated to be ineffective 
and/or undesirable. War in this process is defined as ―rationally unthinkable‖. In the 
second stage of the evolution, war is rejected again not because it’s a bad idea, but 
because it remains subconscious and never comes up as a coherent possibility. War in 
this process is defined by Mueller as ―subrationally unthinkable‖ between trading 
states because their needs, desires and concerns are broader than military concerns. 
Therefore, Mueller has concluded that if the idea of war initiation fades as the 
historical abandonment of duelling and slavery, war ―may be obsolescent‖ and peace 
―can prove to be habit forming, addictive‖ (Mueller, 1988, p.240-244).              
To relate interdependence theory to cross-strait relations, one discovers that 
the argument connecting economic interdependence with less war is highly applicable 
to the current cross-strait relations. Firstly, the interdependence of trade between 
mainland China and Taiwan has been greatly enhanced in the past three decades. 
China has been Taiwan’s top investment destination for many years since the early 
1990s (Chung, 2008). As mentioned in Chapter One, the cross-strait economies are 
gaining so much momentum that the mainland has replaced the United States to 
become Taiwan’s largest trading partner in 2003. Daily increasing cross-strait 
economic interdependence creates a situation in which any kind of disruption, such as 
cross-strait military conflict would disrupt interdependence and thus affect mutual 
benefits of both sides. Therefore, the initiation of conflict becomes a costly way for 
both the mainland and Taiwan to pursue their interests. This conception perfectly fits 
in with Richard Rosecrance’s cost-benefit model for analysing the relationship 
between economic interdependence and conflict. 
Secondly, the current cross-strait economic interdependence accords with the 
argument about free trade’s ability to mitigate warfare between states. As mentioned 
in Chapter One, ECFA was signed in June, 2010. With its aims to reduce tariffs and 
commercial barriers between the mainland and Taiwan, ECFA is assumed/considered 
a cross-strait free trade agreement. As ECFA further comes into practice, the mainland 
and Taiwan will be further connected through a higher level of trade, capital flows and 
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an international division of labour. Therefore, the mainland and Taiwan are unlikely to 
go to war with one another because mainland China’s own wealth and prosperity 
depends on Taiwan’s. Chapter Four will offer a closer examination of ECFA and its 
enforcement.  
Thirdly, the sociological argument relating interdependence to less conflict 
offers another explanation of the current cross-strait relations. The sociological model 
emphasises the importance of the links among people. This idea corresponds to 
Taiwanese scholar Yung Wei’s concept of ―linkage communities‖. According to Wei, 
the extent of ―linkage communities‖ can be used to illustrate the actual process of 
functional integration that occurs through extensive networks of personal contacts 
formed across the Taiwan Strait. Wei argues that, despite prolonged stalemate and 
occasional crises in the Taiwan Strait, gradual but persistent functional integration has 
been a constant ongoing process across the Taiwan Strait. In addition, both Taipei and 
Beijing have made various structural adjustments and accommodations in the forms 
of rules and mechanisms so as to permit continuing socio-economic exchange 
between the two sides. Wei also advances the hypothesis that political integration will 
be rendered much easier if there are sizable and substantive linkage communities 
already in existence on either side of a partitioned society (Wei, 2004). Furthermore, 
Wei’s ―linkage communities‖ idea gains support from Kevin Tze Wai Wong, who 
studies Taiwan’s emerging class rift which is the result of the impact of cross-strait 
economic integration. According to Wong, in Taiwan, class groups with more skills 
that benefit from cross-strait economic integration tend to support the pan-blue camp 
which urges further cross-strait economic ties and eventual reunification, whereas the 
less skilled who are harmed by cross-strait economic integration, are more willing to 
vote for the pan-Green camp which is opposed to cross-strait economic integration 
and in favour of Taiwan independence (Wong, 2010). It is logical to speculate that the 
more people benefit from cross-strait integration, the more support the pan-Blue camp 
will gain. Therefore, a final reunification between the mainland and Taiwan becomes 
feasible through sociological evolution across the Taiwan Strait. Wong’s research 
shows that cross-strait economic integration has contributed to class rift in Taiwan 
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which precisely corresponds with Ronald Rogowski’s new coalition building idea and 
John Mueller’s social and cultural evolution process as mentioned above in this 
chapter.  
 
Summary   
In conclusion, the realist theory, both classical and structural fails to explain the 
current cross-strait relationship for two reasons. Firstly, realist theory focuses on 
power, mainly military power, and it omits the importance of economic and social 
exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan. Secondly, structural realism denies the 
high possibility of international cooperation. However, the cooperation between SEF 
and ARATS has already borne fruit which greatly challenged structural realism.  
 Liberalism on the other hand proves to be more applicable to the current 
cross-strait situation. First, neoliberalism focus on institution building provides both 
the mainland and Taiwan with more possible channels to contact the other side across 
the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, misunderstanding becomes avoidable. In this sense, 
cross-strait institution building is beneficial to prevent and reduce cross-strait military 
conflict. Second, the current economic interdependence between mainland China and 
Taiwan meshes perfectly with the theory of interdependence, which argues that 
economic interdependence decreases international conflict and has the positive effect 
of leading trading partners to peace and stability.  
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Chapter 4 Assessing Cross-strait Relations through ECFA 
Introduction  
As previously mentioned, since Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, cross-strait 
relations have experienced a historic turning point. Cross-strait exchanges and 
cooperation in economics and trade have become ever closer. Both the mainland and 
Taiwan have realised that, as important trading partners, neither side should distance 
itself from the trend towards global and regional economic cooperation. The desire of 
people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has been growing with respect to 
establishing institutional economic cooperation (Chinese Radio Network, 2010). It is 
in this context that mainland China and Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement (ECFA) in Chongqing on 29
th
 June, 2010.       
This chapter first introduces the detailed contents of ECFA in order to help 
readers gain a better understanding of the importance of signing ECFA. A comparison 
of the economic motivations for China and the US to join the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) follows. The research into this comparison is offered in the hope 
that it provides inspirational insights on interpreting the trend of cross-strait economic 
relations under the mechanism of ECFA. Finally, this chapter will apply Neoliberalist 
Theory and the Economic Interdependence Theory to explore the significance of this 
economic agreement, ECFA, to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
4.1 Content of ECFA 
In total, ECFA consist of 5 chapters and 16 articles. The entire text consists of a mere 
2,900 Chinese characters. The text includes a Preamble, Chapter 1 General Principles, 
Chapter 2 Trade and Investment, Chapter 3 Economic Cooperation, Chapter 4 Early 
Harvest, Chapter 5 Other Provisions and five Annexes (Annex I, Product List and 
Tariff Reduction Arrangements Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Goods, Annex II, 
Provisional Rules of Origin Applicable to Products Under the Early Harvest for Trade in 
Goods, Annex III, Safeguard Measures Between the Two Parties Applicable to Products 
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Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Goods, Annex IV, Sectors and Liberalisation 
Measures Under the Early Harvest for Trade in Services and Annex V, Definitions of 
Service Suppliers Applicable to Sectors and Liberalisation Measures Under the Early 
Harvest for Trade in Services). ECFA covers main economic activities across the 
Taiwan Strait, including complementing and perfecting the existing mechanism, 
visualising and exploring future cooperation, evading possible risks and settling 
disputes (China News, 2010a).  
After gaining a brief understanding of the text of ECFA, the next few 
paragraphs will introduce the core content of its text and some important issues 
relative thereto.  
 
4.1.1 Opening Markets for Trade in Goods and Services  
The terms of trade in goods mainly includes the Early Harvest Programme which lists 
the commodities and the process of tariff reduction in the initial phase and market 
accesses between mainland China and Taiwan. According to ECFA terms of trade in 
service, the mainland and Taiwan agree to negotiate on market access for the trade in 
services, include formulating a negating schedule, and consider the question of 
normalising trade in services between the mainland and Taiwan and those items not to 
be opened between cross-strait trade (Zhang, 2010).  
 
4.1.2 The Early Harvest Programme 
The Early Harvest Programme means the prior realisation of tariff reduction and 
exemption between the mainland and Taiwan before the two sides complete their 
negotiation on trade in goods (Tian, 2010). After adjustment to achieve the 
complementarity of their respective industries and with full consideration of the 
concerns of the other side, the mainland and Taiwan issued the list of the Early 
Harvest Programme which includes a large number of items with wide coverage. 
Regarding trade in goods, Taiwan has 539 items among the Early Harvest 
Programme, involving13.83 billion US dollars. To compare this number with that of 
the mainland, it has a 2.02 times larger number of items involved, and a 4.84 times 
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larger sum involved than the mainland. The Early Harvest Programme mainly 
encompasses the Taiwanese enterprises in the traditional industries of petrochemical, 
machinery, textile, and automobile spare parts. It also includes the products of 17 
disadvantaged industries and 18 items of agricultural and fishing products that solely 
export to the mainland. In return, Taiwan reduces tariffs on 267 items of original 
products of the mainland, which fall into four categories: petrochemical products, 
mechanical products, textile products and other products. In addition, within two 
years after the implementation of the Early Harvest Programme, both sides agree to 
follow a three-step approach to gradually realising the goal of a mutual zero tariff on 
the products listed in the Early Harvest Programme (Hu, 2010).  
In the area of trade in services, the mainland will expand and open its eleven 
service industries for Taiwan, including accounting, computer and its related services, 
research and development, conferences, professional design, import quotas for movies, 
hospitals, the maintenance of civil aircraft, banking, securities and insurance. With 
regard to opening the banking industry to Taiwanese enterprises in the mainland 
which the Taiwanese enterprises concern the most, the mainland will issue six specific 
measures to facilitate the convenience of Taiwanese-financed enterprises, including 
allowing Taiwanese banks to establish commercial branches and special financial 
services institutions for small businesses. Taiwanese banks that have operated on the 
mainland for more than one year and made profits one year prior to the application 
can apply to operate RMB (mainland Chinese currency). Taiwan will gradually open 
nine other service industries, including research and development, conferences, 
exhibitions, special product design, import quotas for movies, brokers, sports and 
other entertainment, airline computer reservation systems and banking services (Wang, 
2010c).  
 
4.1.3 Dispute Settlement and Relief 
Currently, the two-conference negotiation mechanism which involves all economic 
fields between the mainland and Taiwan can no longer adapt to the future cross-strait 
economic institutionalisation development under the framework of ECFA. Thus, both 
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the mainland and Taiwan increasingly need a special body responsible for negotiating 
and operating. For this reason, ECFA has specially included the ―Institutional 
Arrangement‖ clause to secure the establishment of a ―Cross-strait Economic 
Cooperation Committee‖ (Wang, 2010b). This Committee shall convene a meeting 
every six months and an interim meeting can be organised when necessary, per the 
approval by both sides. The Committee shall consist of representatives appointed by 
both the mainland and Taiwan, and be responsible for handling matters relevant to 
ECFA. It is proposed that this committee undertake five tasks. Also, the committee 
sets the rule that, according to the mainland and Taiwan’s requirements, the 
committee can constitute a working group to deal with ECFA related issues in specific 
fields. It is safe to claim that the text of ECFA not only confirms the negotiating 
institution and the operational functions for ECFA in the future, but also provides 
legal protection for the establishment and implementation of negotiation 
institutionalisation across the Taiwan Strait.  
The above explanation clearly indicates that the Early Harvest Programme is 
the core content of ECFA and its essence is based on the principle of reciprocity to 
promote and facilitate cross-strait free trade through trimming tariffs. The essence of 
ECFA is further shown in its Preamble, which explicitly states that ―[this Agreement] 
aims to gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment for each other, 
create a fair trade and investment environment, further advance cross-strait trade and 
investment relations ... and establish a cooperation mechanism beneficial to economic 
prosperity and development across the Strait‖ (China News, 2010a). Therefore, ECFA 
has become a special economic cooperative arrangement to normalise, institutionalise 
and liberate the economic ties across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, ECFA not only 
determines the basic structure and development planning for future cross-strait 
economic cooperation, but also provides a legal basis for the establishment of free 
trade zone across the Taiwan Strait. To summarise ECFA marks a significant 
beginning of cross-strait economic integration.  
 
4.2 A Comparison of Sino-US Relations under the APEC Mechanism with 
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Cross-strait Relations under ECFA Mechanism—Similar Economic Motivations    
APEC as an engine for promoting free trade, and economic and technical cooperation 
in the area of Asia and the Pacific, has developed to an organisation which has 
twenty-one members, nearly 40% of the world’s total population, and more than 50% 
of the global GNP since its establishment in 1989. With its trade volume accounting 
for over 40% of the gross global trade, APEC has become an organisation that leads 
the development direction of the Asia-Pacific economies (Yang, 2011). Having such 
distinct benefits, APEC has become an attractive mechanism for more members to 
join. In sum, the cooperative and operational mechanism of APEC has greatly 
promoted its members’ extensive cooperation in investment, trade, technology and 
politics.  
For China and the US, APEC is a reasonable way for them to ease conflicts, 
enhance understanding and reach consensus. A scholar has commented that ―Without 
APEC – a multilateral organisation which creates a natural and convenient 
opportunity for leaders from China and the US to have meetings together, the 
China-US relations are likely to suffer more twists and turns‖ (Li, 2002, p.19). In the 
trend of economic globalisation, China and the US, both as important economies in 
the international market have entered into a situation in which the closer their 
relationship is the more economically interdependent they become. Facilitated by the 
APEC mechanism, bilateral economic exchanges and trade between China and the US 
made great progress in the 1990s (regarding the growth of China-US trade under the 
APEC mechanism, see Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  33 
Figure 1 China’s Imports & Exports to and from the US from 1990 to 19991 
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Figure 2 China’s Imports & Exports to and from the US from 1984 to 2000 (by 
Customs)
2
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The facilitation mechanism of APEC for Sino-US relations is not the focus of 
this chapter. In fact, quite a number of scholars have conducted special studies on how 
                                                        
1 Data Source: National Statistical Bureau, China External Economic Statistical Department. China External 
Economic Statistical Yearbook Database. Accessed November 2011,  
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Navi/HomePage.aspx?id=N2006090328&name=YDWJJ&floor=1.  
2 Data Source: National Statistical Bureau. China Statistical Yearbook Database. Accessed November, 2011,  
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Navi/HomePage.aspx?id=N2010100096&name=YINFN&floor=1.  
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much and to what extent China-US trade has had an impact on the two countries’ 
political relations, but they will not be repeated here. However, APEC has played an 
active role in Sino-US relations. Therefore, an investigation of the context under 
which China and the US joined APEC provides an instructive and significant 
discussion for readers to understand the impact of ECFA on cross-strait economic 
relations.  
 
4.2.1 APEC, China and the US 
After the Cold War, the world entered a new era of globalisation and regionalisation 
which revolved around economic interests and focused on peace, cooperation, and 
common development. In a sense the globalisation of economy can be characterised 
as a gradual process of perfecting the global market after countries open their own 
markets. This process inevitably leads to economic regionalisation, which will 
develop from small-scale regionalisation to large-scale regionalisation and finally 
towards economic globalisation (Chen & Cui, 2006).  
According to some scholars, such as Liu Ke and Zhang Xing, there are three 
main economic motivations inducing the US to have become a founding member of 
APEC and actively promote its development. These motivations included the 
deterioration of the US domestic economy, the change of world economic centres, and 
the competition and pressure from Japan and the regionalised Europe (Liu, 1996; 
Zhang & Liu, 2000).   
Firstly, two pillar industries of the US economy, the automobile and steel 
industries, encountered setbacks in competition and their situation deteriorated. In the 
1980s Japanese automobiles swarmed into the US market, increasing the pressure on 
the US auto industry. Around the same time, due to the fast development of the 
Japanese semiconductor industry, the US lost its monopoly position in the global 
market and was reduced to secondary status. The decline of the US semiconductor 
industry directly led to the downfall of the US electronic industry. As a result, the US 
competitive advantage in certain high technology industries was also greatly 
weakened (Liu & Zu, 2011).  
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Secondly, the Asia-Pacific region had made remarkable development in the 
economic field since the 1950s when the rise of the Japanese economy began. The 
global economic centre has shifted from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean 
(Cheng, 1996). Therefore, the US government started to pay intense attention to the 
development in the Asia-Pacific region. More importantly, at that time the US already 
became the main export market for Asia and therefore the US considered Asia-Pacific 
region as a significant new market to be explored. Bilateral economic bonds between 
the US and Asia-Pacific region was on the increase. The former US President Bill 
Clinton repeatedly emphasised that, ―more than half of American employment relies 
on foreign trade, among which 40% relies on the Asia-Pacific region‖ (Yuan & Li, 
1997, p.37).   
Lastly, the formal launch of the European common market and the gradual 
process of European political integration not only weakened the US political impact 
on Europe, more importantly the US economic interests were pressed by rivalry from 
Europe. However, in Asia due to its geographical proximity, Japan carried out a 
strategy of ―to separate Japan from Europe back to Asia‖ which aims to expand its 
influence in Asia by increasing its exports and investment to Asian Countries. At the 
same time, the trend of allying Asian countries and gaining strength had non-stop 
development in East Asia. ASEAN carried out a neutral strategy to balance between 
the US and Japan therefore gained dominance in the areas of politics, economy and 
foreign affairs within the region of Southeast Asia (Liu, 2009). 
Therefore, in order to contend with the increasingly stronger European Union 
and Japan, and to consolidate its leading position in Asia and realise its economic 
strategy, the US changed its strategy in Asia and Pacific regions in the 1990s. The US 
tried to recover its own economy by benefiting from the economic vitality in the 
Asia-Pacific region and by opening the economic market in East Asian countries. 
Therefore, the US government advocates free trade and actively promotes the 
establishment and development of APEC. The US government considers it necessary 
to actively participate in APEC, and only by doing so can it realise objectives unlikely 
to be reached though bilateral negotiations, thus promoting the process of trade and 
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free investment. In particular, as the largest developing country in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, China’s economy has been burgeoning since it adopted the policy of reform 
and opening. Furthermore, China has enormously rich human resources with low 
wage levels, which is good for developing labour-intensive industries which 
supplement the trade structure of the US. As a result, the US changed its policy 
towards China and started to actively incorporate China into the community. 
As for China, its foreign trade soared from the year in which its government 
proposed reform and opening as the policy of state governance to the year in which 
China joined the APEC, or from 1980 to 1991. In 1980 China’s gross volume of 
import was $ 38.14 billion; this increased to $ 69.60 billion in 1985; in 1988 it 
reached $ 102.7 billion, breaking the record of $100 billion. In 1991 it attained 
$ 135.70 billion (Zhao, 2002). 
However, when China’s reform had progressed to a certain point, the urgent 
question arose as to how to ensure the continuation and enhancement of its reform and 
opening policy by working on its economic environment. Moreover, China’s reform 
and opening had been accompanied by growth in its foreign trade. In other words, the 
continuation of China’s economic growth could not be sustained without 
corresponding growth in its foreign trade. Consequently, China had to integrate into 
the international economy for the sake of its development. In a time where 
protectionism and regionalisation had been developing and its trade frictions with 
other countries increasing in both breadth and depth - especially those with the US - if 
China intended to continually develop its foreign trade, it could no longer rely solely 
on unilateral trade agreements, but had to participate in bilateral and multilateral 
economic cooperation (Lu, 1997). 
Nevertheless, China encountered great difficulties when trying to join the 
WTO. Since 75% of its foreign trade and 90% of its foreign investment were 
concentrated in the Asia-Pacific Region (Guo, 1999), this factor was of significant 
import in China choosing to join APEC. APEC is a channel for China to intensify its 
cooperation with other member states - especially the US - and to promote mutual 
economic dealings. Accordingly, China actively supported the principles of 
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multilateral cooperation and the open market of APEC. China also hoped to benefit 
from the rise of the Asia-Pacific Region and augment its comprehensive national 
power. Thus China’s entry into the APEC is not only consistent with the trend of 
economic globalisation, but also addresses its demand to maintain the growth of its 
foreign trade. 
To summarise, both China and the US clearly realised that in an era of 
economic globalisation and political multi-polarisation, the economic interests of both 
countries increased their mutual reliance as never before. In a certain sense, one 
country’s development contributes to the prosperity of the other; and win-win among 
countries has replaced the traditional zero-sum game. Though China and the US differ 
in respect to their resources structures, industrial structures and consumption 
preferences, the complementarity of their trade structures may be fully utilised by 
sharing with one another their giant markets, and their respective competitive power 
may be strengthened by their potential in cooperation. Thus, for both China and the 
US, actively joining and participating in APEC responded to their respective demands 
and accorded with their economic interests, under the mechanism of which they were 
able to engage in economic coordination and exchanges. 
 
4.2.2 ECFA, the mainland and Taiwan 
Since 1979 cross-strait trade has been growing by a two-digit percentage annually. In 
1979 when trading started, the gross volume was merely 80 million US dollars. By 
2010, it grew by hundreds of times to 145.37 billion US dollars. The growth rate in 
average in these three decades was 46.8% (See Figure 3). In 2003 the mainland 
replaced the US and Japan as the biggest trading partner of Taiwan; Taiwan also 
became the second-largest import market for the mainland (Lin & Yi, 2006).   
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Figure 3 Cross-Strait Trade from 1979 - 2010
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In these years, however, although the gross trading volume has been rising across 
the Taiwan Strait, the economic position of Taiwan in the mainland’s economy has 
been decreasing. Surprisingly, Taiwan’s economic reliance on the mainland has been 
increasing (See Figure 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 1978 – 2005 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. ―Statistics Regarding Cross-Strait 
Trade from 1978 to 2005‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed November 2011,  
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718210.htm.  
2006 – 2008 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. ―Statistics Regarding Cross-Strait 
Trade from 2000 to 2008‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed November 2011, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718251.htm.  
2009 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. ―Statistics Regarding Cross-Strait Trade and 
Investment from January to December 2009‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed 
November 2011, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110128_1737094.htm.  
2010 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. ―Statistics Regarding Cross-Strait Trade and 
Investment from January to December 2010‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed 
November 2011, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110128_1737103.htm.  
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Figure 4 Cross-Strait Trade Interdependency from 1992 to 2005
4
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For instance, in 2005 Taiwan had a lower market share in the mainland market 
than South Korea did; in contrast, products from the mainland occupied more than 
one-tenth of the gross import of Taiwan (Xiong, 2005). Ma Ying-jeou repeatedly 
stated that exports to the mainland already exceeded 40% of Taiwan’s gross export 
(Jin, 2010). According to the latest statistics, from January to October 2010, the gross 
imports and exports of the Chinese mainland were approximately 2.39 trillion US 
dollars, in which the trade between the mainland and Taiwan was approximately 
118.68 billion US dollars, merely 5.02% of the foreign trade volume of the mainland. 
On the other hand, according to Taiwanese statistics, from January to October 2010, 
Taiwan’s gross exports were 226.44 billion US dollars, in which exports to the 
mainland and Hong Kong were 95.09 billion US dollars, 42% of Taiwan’s gross 
exports (Wang, 2011). Clearly, in cross-strait trade, the imports and exports of the 
                                                        
4 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. ―Cross-Strait Trade Statistic and Analysis from 1979 to 
2005‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed November 2011, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718211.htm.  
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mainland and Taiwan were severely unbalanced, with the trade deficit growing year 
after year. 
Apart from its severe trade deficit with the mainland, Taiwan will also probably 
be marginalised in terms of regional economic integration. Furthermore, due to 
political causes, it is very hard for Taiwan to sign a free trade agreement with other 
countries. In an era of economic regionalisation, this increases the difficulties for 
Taiwan in exploring overseas markets. In addition, as the relevant agreements of the 
Chinese mainland with ASEAN enter into effect, Taiwanese industries will suffer high 
tariff barriers compared with ASEAN nations. As a result, the market for products 
from Taiwan will be pre-empted by similar products from ASEAN, Japan and South 
Korea. The resulting heavy losses will imperil Taiwan’s economy. The General 
Association of Industry and Commerce of Taiwan has computed potential losses. 
From 2010 on, petrochemical products from ASEAN sold to the mainland will enjoy 
zero tariffs. Without signing ECFA, petrochemical products that Taiwan sells to the 
mainland will be taxed at tariffs on goods at 5% to 19%. In such case, Taiwanese 
products will not be able to compete with those of the ASEAN nations. According to 
other predictive statistics, without signing ECFA, Taiwan’s overall economy will 
decrease by 1% (Liu & Bian, 2009). 
Taiwanese society has realised that economic regionalisation is an inevitable 
trend. While the ASEAN nations have been deepening their economic regionalisation 
under the goad of the financial crisis, Taiwan confronts material risks of being 
excluded from the wave of economic regionalisation in East Asia. Therefore, if the 
Taiwanese economy is to avoid the serious results of decreasing competitiveness, 
retreat of foreign investors and local enterprises, and a drastic upsurge in the 
unemployment rate, it must change its attitude towards cross-strait economic and 
trade cooperation. 
The mainland is the most important export target region for Taiwan. As a result, 
it is of greater value to normalise the abnormal cross-strait economic ties than to make 
possible free trade with other countries or regions (Shanghai WTO Affairs 
Consultation Centre, 2011). If Taiwan signs a free trade agreement with the mainland, 
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it is indubitable that in return, the mainland, as the locomotive of the global economy, 
will help Taiwan integrate itself into the global economic and trading system, as well 
as into the economic regionalisation of East Asia. Meanwhile, this will also help 
Taiwan better its macroeconomic atmosphere by signing such an agreement, creating 
conditions for Taiwan to recreate itself as a global innovation centre, a pivot of 
Asia-Pacific trade, and the headquarters of Taiwanese merchants and foreign 
merchants operating in that region (China Taiwan Organisation, 2010).  
In September 2009, the economic authorities of Taiwan published the Assessment 
Report on the Effects of ECFA, which it had commissioned the Chung-hua Institution 
for Economic Research of Taiwan to prepare. According to the report, after signing 
ECFA, the economic growth rate of Taiwan would increase approximately by 1.65 % 
to 1.72%, providing 257,000 to 263,000 additional jobs, which would materially assist 
Taiwan in solving its unemployment problem. The report also stated that it would 
adduce positive effects for the chemical rubber, mechanical engineering, textile, steel 
and petroleum industries and coal product manufacturing in Taiwan by signing ECFA 
with the mainland (Caijing Network, 2009). Therefore, it is inevitable that Taiwan 
would chose to sign ECFA with the mainland. In fact, Taiwan had no option but to do 
it. 
The mainland had also been upholding an open policy for Taiwan in the 
meanwhile. To illustrate, the preference treatment of the mainland for Taiwanese 
business people investing in the mainland is one of the examples of such an open and 
welcoming attitude. The mainland can not only utilise the capital, technology and 
management of Taiwanese business people to help upgrade its industries, but also 
enlarge the export of its products to Taiwan to secure the ongoing growth of its 
foreign trade. However, the economic concerns in this respect are only one part of the 
whole picture. In fact, Taiwan is the greatest beneficiary from the signing of ECFA. 
First, Taiwan’s contribution to the economic growth of the mainland is limited. 
According to statistics, up until the end of December 2009, the mainland had 
approved an accumulative total of 80,061 programmes for Taiwanese investors, 
actually using 49.54 billion US dollars of Taiwanese investment, only 5.2% of the 
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accumulative total of foreign investment in the mainland (Taiwan Affairs Office of the 
State Council PRC, 2010). Secondly, according to the ―early harvest programme‖ of 
ECFA, the mainland benefits far less than Taiwan from it. Among the trading products 
that are to gradually reduce to a zero tariff within three years, 539 types of Taiwanese 
products will benefit, but only 267 types of mainland products will, one-half of those 
of Taiwan. In addition, the mainland has agreed with the listing by Taiwan to adjust 
downwards a total sum of 13.83 billion US dollars of the tariff on Taiwan; while 
Taiwan has agreed with the listing by the mainland to adjust downwards a total sum 
of 2.86 billion US dollars of the tariff on the mainland. Taiwan enjoys a tax exemption 
sum four times as large as the mainland does. Furthermore, the mainland offers to 
Taiwan policy measures more preferential than those under the WTO policies, while 
Taiwan offers an equal treatment with the measures under the WTO at the same level 
(Liu, 2010). 
As is shown by these sources, the benefits of the mainland and Taiwan are 
very unbalanced. In some sense, they have not achieved ―win-win‖. This explains 
why many Taiwanese hissed at signing ECFA, when the mainland advanced ECFA 
though the economic benefits on both side were highly unbalanced. The opposing 
Taiwanese questioned the hidden political intentions behind the ―benefit donation 
theory‖, and worried that Taiwan could not afford the ―political donation‖ that 
followed immediately (He, 2010). 
Notwithstanding this circumstance, viewed in the long term, what ECFA 
means to the mainland shall lead to a completely different conclusion: after signing 
ECFA the Chinese mainland will identify with Taiwan regarding principles of trade 
thanks to the geographic and language advantages (Meng, Jiang & Zhao, 2011). If the 
mainland and Taiwan can deepen their economic and trading cooperation within the 
framework of ECFA, both sides across the Taiwan Strait will definitely form a 
―mainland-Taiwan‖ economy; together with Hong Kong and Macau, they will form a 
―greater China economic sphere‖. 
By reviewing the context in which China and the US joined APEC and by 
analyzing the reasons why the mainland and Taiwan signed ECFA, it is not difficult to 
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discern that economic motivation is common in both cases. If people claim that the 
Chinese and American accession to APEC corresponds to trend of economic 
globalisation, the mainland and Taiwan signing ECFA conforms to the trend of 
economic regionalisation. Both the former and the latter are based on economic 
interests: free trade and better living. In fact, many scholars, for example Guo Jie 
(Guo, 2008) and Hua Min (Hua, Wang & Zhou, 2002) believe that both trends lead to 
the same destination. Similar to Sino-US economic and trade ties under the APEC 
mechanism, cross-strait relations also have a solid base for cooperation under ECFA 
mechanism. Based on the common economic interests of the mainland and Taiwan, 
ECFA will create conditions for the unification of both economies across the Taiwan 
Strait at a higher level. 
 
4.3 ECFA will Promote Peace and Stability between the Mainland and Taiwan 
As shown by the history of international relations, it is not unusual for trade to 
become a force of peace. Only when two countries both recognise that the political 
and economic interests derived from trade are positive and need to be maintained by 
common efforts can trade become an effective motivation to prevent escalation of 
conflicts and promote sound development of political relations (Cai & Chen, 2011). 
Apparently, for the mainland and Taiwan, ECFA is able to promote the healthy 
development of cross-strait relations. Compared with the purely economic 
motivations explaining why China and the US entered into APEC, the reality of 
cross-strait economic interests and mutual reliance proves that both the mainland and 
Taiwan urgently need ECFA. Both sides have manifested their sincere desire to 
maintain cross-strait economic exchanges under ECFA. As for the long-term 
cross-strait peace and stability, this demands not only a fundamental principle of 
seeking common ground while preserving differences based on economics, but also a 
mechanism whereby they resolve conflicts and increase trust. The institutional 
development for establishing a Cross-strait Economic Cooperation Committee per 
ECFA, shall provide institutional experience to establish cooperative mechanisms 
between the mainland and Taiwan in other respects. Next, with the Interdependence 
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Theory and Neoliberalist theory, the author will expound the role of ECFA in 
cross-strait peace and stability.  
 
4.3.1 ECFA Promotes Cross-Strait Peace and Stability by Strengthening Mutual 
Economic Interdependence 
Both the economic liberalists Adam Smith (Smith, 2009), David Ricardo (Ricardo, 
2011) and Karl Marx (Marx, 1975) deem that the daily economy is not a pure 
economy, but also a political phenomenon. Baron De Montesquieu asserts that peace 
is the natural result of trade (Montesquieu, 2009). When cross-strait relations need to 
be deepened, it is especially necessary for either side to use the ―uniting‖ economic 
and trade ties to break the stalemate by showing its sincere desire for cooperation to 
the other side. Thus, when both sides are very cautious on political issues, regarding 
which even no major action is possible to be taken by either side, their cooperative 
economic and trade ties become an effective medium or agent that improves their 
political relations. In fact, ECFA not only is a result from the early-phase trade 
development and mutual economic reliance, but also is a policy that will safeguard the 
future unification of both economies, and further a mechanism that promotes peace 
and stability.  
Economic and trade ties can generate unity that stabilises relations because 
cooperation and exchange in trade create great common interests for both parties.  
Trade is realistic and brings tangible, measurable and comparable absolute interests, 
and the desire of people to pursue interests is infinite and ceaseless. Development in 
trade not only produces more employment opportunities, but also enables consumers 
to enjoy cheap and good products and services, which maximising the value of 
consumer expenses. Moreover, businessmen and entrepreneurs are able to maximise 
their profits by pursuing the best allocation of resources when trading. All this will 
benefit the governance of the state. When all parties enjoy their own benefits from 
trade, this surely promotes internal political stability (Huang, 2008b). On the other 
hand, according to economics, the nature of capital is to expand. As long as no 
political red light obstructs it, trade will continue and expand (Marx, 1975). The 
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groups and departments that enjoy vested interests from trade ties will no doubt try to 
urge the government to stabilise its policies so as to continue to benefit from such 
policies. Therefore, motivated by interests, the policies of peace and stability, similar 
with trade, also have the momentum to develop.   
In fact, thanks to the efforts and close coordination of the relevant government 
agencies of both the mainland and Taiwan, ECFA has already manifested its initial 
success. According to statistics by the PRC General Administration of Customs, since 
the implementation of ECFA early harvest programme, the import and export of 
goods have been steadily increasing. Up until March 2011, the mainland has imported 
684 million US dollars of goods produced in Taiwan, with tax cuts of 127 million 
RMB. With respect to the utility efficiency, in the first season of 2011 the mainland 
imported from Taiwan 333 eight-digit-tax-number items of products under ECFA, 
which involved all the ten categories of tax-cut products in ECFA early harvest 
programme of goods, or 59.8% of all the 557 ECFA preferential imported products 
(Lin & He, 2011). In addition, contrary to the concerns of the opposing people, the 
circumstances did not happen where products from the mainland will pound the 
enterprises on the island if they are to enter Taiwan. Instead, ECFA early harvest 
programme benefits the small-and-medium-sized Taiwanese businesses; the original 
products of Taiwan also swiftly utilise this platform to export to the mainland, further 
opening their markets therein (Xinhua News, 2011). In summary, the positive effects 
of ECFA have far exceeded their prior concerns. 
It is expected that as ECFA early harvest programme is further popularised and 
implemented, cross-strait trade will continue to rise. After ECFA attains its basic goals, 
and after a cross-strait free-trade zone is established as a reality, the economic 
unification of the mainland and Taiwan will enter a new phase. When cross-strait 
markets further open, enabling goods, services, capital, labour and other productive 
elements to flow freely, cross-strait economic unification will reach a new summit.  
The third part of this chapter demonstrates that the successful signing of ECFA 
is based on rational reflection on respective economic interests. ECFA makes possible 
closer cross-strait relations and a lays more solid economic basis for cross-strait 
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reconciliation and peace. Just as the Interdependence Theory holds, the core issue of 
contemporary international relations is a socio-economic issue. Thanks to the 
reciprocal trade and the expansion of the economic interdependence network among 
nations, they establish a bond of common interests to jointly enjoy the vested interests 
provided by peace. Therefore, the argument that ECFA will play the role of stabilising 
the cross-strait political relations in the future is in accord with the Interdependence 
Theory of the international political economy. 
 
4.3.2 ECFA Provides a Platform and Institutional Experience for Future 
Cross-strait Exchanges in Other Fields 
Neoliberalism emphasises that a system created by rational persons heavily influences 
the decision-making and actions of people in an interdependent society. It also asserts 
that a system can decrease transaction costs, facilitate information exchanges, reduce 
uncertainty and prevent fraud, thus rendering order and cooperation possible under 
anarchy (Su, 2000). 
Examining cross-strait hostility and conflicts, we find that the ultimate cause is 
that the six-decade separate political rule has created a lack of mutual trust. This 
mistrust is largely because the mainland and Taiwan have had no regular contact 
mechanism. There was no mutually-acceptable principle to guide their exchanges; 
when a problem cropped up, they could not find a way to handle it appropriately. The 
problems might not have been interlinked, but viewed as a whole they were grievous. 
Few common interests and common experiences survived the long separation and 
confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. As a result, common memories and 
identification are absent between the people of the mainland and the people of Taiwan. 
However, without cultural identification there cannot be ethnic identification; without 
ethnic identification the basis for national identification cannot exist. 
Viewed from the whole picture of cross-strait relations, signing ECFA not only 
regularised the disorderly forms of trade cooperation for three decades, but also 
created an accurate and rigorous system. The more far-reaching significance of 
signing ECFA is to develop cross-strait relations on a more proactive platform (Liu & 
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Bian, 2009). Through ECFA and economic cooperation, the mainland and Taiwan will 
not only further deepen their people-to-people exchanges, but also cultivate common 
memories of history, culture, economy and politics which will no doubt help heal the 
wounds of history (The Central People’s Government of China News, 2011). 
The cross-strait ECFA negotiations will help both sides ease the scepticism 
and fear of both, and boost the formation of mutual trust and collective identity. On 
the one hand, ECFA promotes trust by establishing a code of conduct, a supervisory 
mechanism and penalty measures. Within ECFA framework, the mainland and Taiwan 
established the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee, prescribed a series of 
principles and procedures with the core thrust of tariff deduction, for example, the 
Rules of Origin, the tariff discount or exemption mode, the customs procedures, and 
the dispute settlement body. No doubt this will provide a platform for both sides to 
expand their consensus and increase mutual trust, one which clarifies the future trend 
of cross-strait relations. On the other hand, through economic cooperation, ECFA 
cultivates a sense of common destiny across the Taiwan Strait, and facilitates the 
development of mutual trust and collective identity. Therefore, through facilitating 
cross-strait cultural exchanges, a common cultural identify may be forged, which in 
return may coalesce into a national identity. Only by doing this will a foundation be 
laid to further cross-strait peace and stability.  
Though both sides now have reached the consensuses of ―first easy things, 
then hard things‖, ―first economy then politics‖, ―seeking common ground while 
preserving differences‖ and ―putting aside disputes‖, political discord still persists. As 
to how to institutionally realise the equal negotiation by both, this is a key issue 
pertinent to cross-strait peace and stability. In fact, the successful signing of ECFA is 
exactly a new phase or starting point in cross-strait relations entering institutional 
negotiations. It is of realistic value to sign a cross-strait political peace treaty, but 
compared with the trend of great exchange, great cooperation and great development 
of both sides thanks to their mutual economic reliance, it is not an issue that comes 
foremost or one that must be resolved first. Assuming that people across the Taiwan 
Strait can successfully lead this exchange, cooperation, development and blending in 
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the next two decades, this will inevitably result in peace and stability across the 
Taiwan Strait. Therefore, in such a sense, the step itself, whereby the mainland and 
Taiwan utilise ECFA to deepen their cooperation and exchanges, is an example in 
itself of cross-strait stability and peace.  
 
Summary  
ECFA embodies significant content in the establishment of cross-strait institutional 
economic cooperation because ECFA determines the basic structure and development 
planning for future cross-strait relations. Though signing ECFA is of economic import 
in its fundamental character, ECFA itself is in reality a product of mutual political 
trust between the mainland and Taiwan. While accelerating economic interdependence, 
it benefits both sides with respect to accumulating mutual trust, promoting mutual 
political dialogue, and gradually thawing sensitive issues. Therefore, as the media has 
observed, ECFA is a historic economic cooperation agreement that transcends its 
economic aspect. Its regularisation of economic and trade ties symbolises the closest 
era that the mainland and Taiwan have entered into after six decades of separation. It 
creates a proactive atmosphere for cross-strait peace and stability (Li, 2010b).  
 To view ECFA from the standpoint of an economic policy, economic concern 
requires both the mainland and Taiwan to formulate their own policy based on the 
principle of upholding their own interests. However the economic principle of mutual 
reciprocity and mutual benefit requires both the mainland and Taiwan not only to 
protect their own interests, but also try to take care of the interest of the other side. In 
order to develop a prosperous cross-strait economy, both the mainland and Taiwan 
have to strengthen cross-strait dialogue and coordination. Therefore, in the wave of 
economic globalisation, economic cooperation as one of the most important issues in 
cross-strait relations will promote the relationship between mainland China and 
Taiwan towards interdependence and cooperation, definitely not confrontation and 
containment.  
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Chapter 5 Role of Taiwanese Business People: An Important 
Element for Cross-strait Peace and Stability 
Introduction 
Taiwanese business people
5
 are not only the main instruments of cross-strait 
economic activities and trade, but also are messengers of cross-strait communications. 
Taiwan business people play a significant role of reducing misunderstanding and 
increasing mutual trust between mainland China and Taiwan. Therefore, a review of 
the roles of Taiwan business people in cross-strait social, cultural and political 
exchanges is of crucial importance for readers to understand the future trend of 
cross-strait relations. 
In this chapter, the author first presents an introduction to the history and current 
state of investment by Taiwanese business people on the mainland so as to afford the 
reader a thorough understanding of them. Thereafter, the author will illustrate with 
relevant data the contributions of Taiwanese business people to the economic 
development of both the mainland and Taiwan, and their important role in 
institutionalizing cross-strait trade. Also, an attempt is made to prove the fact that it is 
investment by Taiwanese business people on the mainland that is increasingly 
deepening the cultural and social exchanges between both sides across the Taiwan 
Strait. Finally, the author demonstrates the significance of Taiwanese business people 
in cross-strait peace and stability by describing their close relations with both 
governments across the Taiwan Strait.  
 
5.1 History and Current State of Investment by Taiwanese Business People on 
the Mainland 
                                                        
5 At Present, the definition of Taiwan Business People is still missing. This thesis adopts Li Fei’s definition which 
refers to Taiwan Business People as ―the investors from the island of Taiwan, overseas Taiwan Enterprises or 
organizations came to invest on the mainland during the 1980s ‖ (Li, 2004, p.393).  
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Due to the unique historical background of cross-strait economic development, both 
Taiwan and the mainland have combined their political consideration with their 
economic concerns, a circumstance which gives rise to the complexity of interlaced 
economic interests and political controversies in trade interactions between mainland 
China and Taiwan. According to research conducted by Shi Zulin and Huang Tao (Shi 
& Huang, 2007), political elements notably affect cross-strait economic and trade 
relations. The authors’ findings also correspond with their opinion following an 
investigation into the relevant data (see Figure 5) on investment by Taiwanese 
business people on the mainland from 1989 to 2010. Therefore, a review of the 
economic and trade policies of both sides and an investigation into the development 
of Taiwanese investment on the mainland serves as an indispensable aid in charting 
the progress of investment by Taiwanese business people on the mainland.  
 
 
Figure 5 Taiwan Business People’s Mainland Investment from 1989 to 20106 
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After viewing relevant academic books in this field (Yu, 1999; Wang, 2000; Yan, 
2011; Lv, Cheng, & Zou, 2008), and based on the periodicity as demonstrated by the 
time sequence in Figure 5, the author categorizes investment by Taiwanese business 
                                                        
61989-1999 Data Source: Yan An. ―Studies on Taiwan Business People’s Investment on the Mainland from the 
Political and Economic Perspective‖ (Yan, 2011).    
2000-2010 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Council of the State Council PRC. ―Taiwan Business People’s Mainland 
Investment from 2000 to 2008‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed in November 
2011, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajm/lajm/201101/t20110121_1718252.htm. 
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people on the mainland into the following five phases: 
5.1.1 1979-1986: An Exploring Phase 
In 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (―SCNPC‖) 
issued the Message to Taiwan Compatriots, which ―voiced an invitation for the 
opposite side of the Taiwan Strait to commence cross-strait trade and conduct 
cross-strait economic, trade and cultural exchanges‖  (Wang, 1999a, p.5). In April 
1983, the State Council of the PRC promulgated the Measures of Special Preferences 
for Taiwanese Compatriots to Invest in the Special Economic Zones to encourage 
Taiwanese business people to invest on the mainland. However, because the Taiwan 
authorities implemented the ―Three Nos‖ policy (no contact, no compromise, and no 
negotiations with the mainland) and forbade civil exchanges, the gross volume and 
number of projects of Taiwanese investment on the mainland were extremely limited 
during that period. Where investment existed, it was surreptitious and fragmentary. 
For example, in January 1981 the first Taiwanese-invested enterprises appeared in 
Shenzhen and Quanzhou, without exception in the form of such Sino-foreign 
investment vehicles as Hong Kong Investment or joint ventures in an effort to avert 
punishment by the Taiwan authorities (Wang, 2000).  
5.1.2 1987-1993: A Fast Growing Phase 
In 1987 Taiwan declared the suspension of martial law and controls over foreign visits. 
Taiwan also officially allowed people to visit their relatives on the mainland. Many 
Taiwanese business people availed themselves of that occasion to examine business 
opportunities on the mainland. After 1988, considering their own interests, the Taiwan 
authorities shifted their stance towards Taiwan business people’s mainland investment 
from proscription to acquiescence, and issued the Temporary Regulation on the 
Relations among People across the Taiwan Strait. With conditions, the Taiwan 
authorities allowed Taiwanese business people to invest indirectly on the mainland. 
On the other hand, the mainland also timely provided favourable conditions for 
Taiwanese business people. The Provisions of the State Council on Encouraging 
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Investment by Compatriots from Taiwan was promulgated on July 6 1988 to protect 
the lawful rights and interests of Taiwanese investors. In addition, investment zones 
for Taiwanese business people were approved for establishment in Haicang and 
Maiwei of Fujian Province on February 1, 1989. During the period from 1987 to 1993, 
encouraged by the Taiwan authorities’ loosening policies towards Taiwan business 
people’s mainland investment, the enthusiasm of Taiwanese business people to invest 
on the mainland gradually rose to a high level. 
In 1992, after Deng Xiaoping delivered his famous speeches affirming the 
reform and opening-up policy during his famous inspection tour of South China and 
the establishment of a socialist market economy, Taiwan business people initiated a 
new wave of massive investment on the mainland. The ―Wang-Koo talks‖ inspired a 
mania among medium-and-large-sized Taiwanese enterprises - including listed 
companies - to send business exploration teams to the mainland. The trend of more 
large enterprises or groups investing on the mainland became apparent (Yan, 2011). 
According to statistics, 1992 was the year in which Taiwanese investment in the 
mainland grew at the fastest rate. Throughout 1992, Taiwanese business people 
invested in 6,430 projects on the mainland having a gross volume of 5.54 billion US 
dollars. Compared with the 1991 data, Taiwan business people’s mainland investment 
increased by 2.7 times and 3 times respectively (China External Economic Statistical 
Yearbook Editorial Committee, 1993, p.68). This unprecedented growth in Taiwan 
business people’s mainland investment reached its apex in 1993. 
5.1.3 1994-2000: A Slowdown Phase 
In 1996 the Taiwan authorities implemented the ―Go South Policy‖7, attempting to 
cool down the heat of investment in the mainland. However, the real trend was that 
the mainland was still the focus of Taiwan’s outbound investment. As a result, the 
Taiwan authorities asserted that it was necessary to shape its policy towards the 
mainland as ―patient instead of hasty and far-sighted to ensure stability‖. The Taiwan 
                                                        
7 Go South Policy refers to the Taiwan authorities’ policy of guiding Taiwanese business people to invest in 
Southeast Asia instead of mainland China. 
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authorities believed Taiwan business people must consider cross-strait political risks 
when doing business with the mainland (Yu, 1999). In April 1997, the Taiwan 
Legislative Yuan passed the Draft Regulation on the Relations among the People of 
the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region, primarily to limit Taiwanese business 
people’s mainland investment. Therefore, the growth rate of projects by Taiwan 
business people approved by the Taiwan authorities during this phase was essentially 
negative. 
Although cross-strait relations were undergoing a period of freeze, Taiwanese 
business people’s willingness to invest in the mainland did not flag. According to 
statistics in 1996, more than 60% of people from the Taiwan business and commercial 
community expressed pessimism about the political stability and social order of the 
island of Taiwan. More than 54% of Taiwan business people were dissatisfied with the 
investment environment in Taiwan. In sharp contrast, 77% of Taiwan business people 
were optimistic about the investment environment on the mainland (Zhao, 1996). 
During the period from 1994 to 2000, the mainland’s efforts to actively serve Taiwan 
business people and protect their rights and interests contributed much to Taiwan 
business people’s enthusiasm to invest in the mainland. In 1994 the mainland 
promulgated the Law on the Protection of the Investment of Taiwan Compatriots, 
creating for them an open environment of development in accordance with law and 
fair competition, while rendering their operating rights and interests more secure. 
Thus, though the investment scales dropped year after year during the period from 
1994 to 2000, the virtual investment volume did not dramatically change, staying at 3 
billion US dollars each year except for 2000 (See Figure 5).  
5.1.4 2001-2005: A Second Growing Phase 
The policy ―patient instead of hasty, and far-sighted to ensure stability‖ implemented 
by the Taiwan authorities proved of poor effect for two reasons. Firstly, it failed to 
stop the heated wave of Taiwanese investment in the mainland. Secondly, this policy 
forced many Taiwan enterprises to go underground with respect to investing in the 
mainland, e.g. Taiwanese enterprises resorted to the circumvention of first investing 
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capital in Hong Kong, Macau or other locations, and then transferring the capital from 
such third land to the mainland. Taiwan business people’s indirect mainland 
investment was hard for the Taiwan authorities to control. In the mean time, Taiwan’s 
economic growth drastically dropped due to the Taiwan administration’s shift and the 
uncertain policies of the new government. Many Taiwanese enterprises moved out of 
the island of Taiwan seeking greater business opportunities (CCTV News, 2002). 
Because the Taiwanese administration substituted the ―proactively open and 
efficiently administered‖ policy for the ―patient instead of hasty, and far-sighted to 
ensure stability‖ policy (People’s News, 2002a), Taiwan had to open up those 
programmes where had previously been restricted and reopen cross-strait trade and 
investment. 
On the other hand, the mainland government insisted on the attitude of ―not 
affecting or interfering in cross-strait economic cooperation with political 
disagreements‖ (China Taiwan Organization, 2004) so as to actively protect the rights 
and interests of Taiwanese business people on the mainland. As a result, the volume 
and number of programmes forming the object of Taiwanese investment powerfully 
resurged after years of ebbing and began to rise again. According to the statistics of a 
relevant Taiwanese government agency, the volume of investment by Taiwanese 
business people in mainland China rose from 2.784 billion US dollars in 2001 to 
6.007 billion US dollars in 2005. Since 2002, the percentage of Taiwan business 
people’s mainland investment was more than 50% of Taiwan’s gross outbound 
investment in other countries or regions. In 2005, 71.07% of total Taiwan outbound 
investment went to mainland China (Zhang, 2007a, p.39). 
5.1.5 2005-Present: A Fully Developing Phase 
From April 26, 2005 to May 3,2005 Hu Jintao, Lian Zhan and Song Chuyu held the 
historic meeting, proposing ―to establish cross-strait economic cooperation 
mechanisms‖ (People’s News, 2005). On December 5, 2008, both sides signed the 
cross-strait Postal Agreement, cross-strait Sea Transport Agreement and cross-strait 
Air Transport Agreement, basically materializing cross-strait postal, sea and air links. 
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In addition, the mainland issued the Circular on the Administrative Measures for 
Investment of Mainland Enterprises in the Taiwan Region, confirming at the central 
government level the relevant measures for mainland capital to enter Taiwan. In June 
2009, the Taiwan authorities promulgated the Measures on the Investment by People 
of the Mainland Region in Taiwan, the Measures for Approving For-Profit Entities of 
the Mainland Region to Establish Branch Companies or Offices in Taiwan, thus 
officially opening the door for mainland enterprise to invest in Taiwan and to establish 
branch companies there. The opening up of mainland enterprises’ Taiwan investment 
marked the advent of the era of mutual direct investment between mainland China and 
Taiwan. The replacement of one-sided investment provided new opportunities for 
both business people from the two sides. Currently, there are more than one million 
Taiwanese business people living on the mainland. 54% of Taiwanese outbound 
investment targets the mainland, and more than 90 of the 100 largest Taiwanese 
enterprises have invested in the mainland (Zhou, 2008).  
According to relevant data published by the mainland government, from 1991 to 
2010, the number of programmes which Taiwanese business people invested on the 
mainland grew from 1,735 to 3,072. In the decades from 1990 to 2010, the Taiwanese 
capital that the mainland virtually utilized accumulated to 51.544 billion US dollars, 
among which 2.48 billion US dollars
8
 were virtually utilized in 2010. The mainland 
market became a primary target region for Taiwanese capital, and the proportion of 
such investment in the gross foreign investment of Taiwan has since been rising (See 
Table 1).  
         
 
 
 
                                                        
8 This Number is calculated and based on the data released by Ministry of Commerce PRC and Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the State Council PRC. 
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Table 1 Taiwan’s Total Overseas Direct Investment & Taiwan’s Mainland Investment 
from 1981 to 2003 
9
       Unit: US$ 100 Million 
Year Total Investment 
Value  
To the Mainland Mainland’s Proportion of 
Taiwan’s Total Overseas 
Investment 
1981——1990 ~40 ~7 ~20 
1991 18.30 1.74 9.52 
1992 11.34 2.47 21.78 
1993 48.29 31.68 65.61 
1994 25.79 9.62 37.31 
1995 24.50 10.93 44.61 
1996 33.95 12.29 36.21 
1997 72.28 43.34 59.96 
1998 53.31 20.35 38.17 
1999 45.22 12.53 27.71 
2000 76.84 26.07 33.93 
2001 71.76 27.84 38.80 
2002 100.93 67.23 66.61 
2003 116.67 76.99 65.99 
1991——2003 699.18 343.09 49.07 
 
According to the latest data, until the end of 2009, the Taiwan authorities have 
ratified an accumulative gross volume of 82 billion US dollars of Taiwanese 
investment in the mainland, almost 60% of Taiwan’s gross foreign investment in these 
years (Xie, 2010). Meanwhile Taiwan remains an important source region from which 
the mainland absorbs external investment (See Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Data Source: Li Long Sheng. ―A Research about the Impacts of Taiwan’s Business People’s Direct Investment to 
the Mainland on Taiwan’s Economy from 1991 to 2003‖ (Li, 2005).   
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Figure 6 Ranking of Taiwan’s Investment on Total Mainland’s Overseas Investment 
from 1990 to 2008
10
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After more than twenty years’ development, the industries which Taiwanese 
business people invested on the mainland have expanded from the processing 
industries and labour-intensive industries to include capital-intensive industries and 
technology-intensive industries (Su, 2011), in particular, the electronics industry 
characterized by advanced technology and high added-value, and the financial 
industry and the insurance industry that wield such significant economic clout. 
According to statistics, from 1991 to 2004 the proportion of investment by Taiwanese 
business people in the electronics and electric products manufacturing industries 
accounted for 34.1% of the gross volume of Taiwanese investment on the mainland 
(Shi & Huang, 2007, p.139). In short, the investment by Taiwanese business people in 
the mainland has shown a trend towards diversification. Moreover, Taiwanese 
business people’ investment in the mainland has spread to encompass the entire 
country, in addition to creating intensive Taiwanese investment zones in the Pearl 
River Delta, the Yangze River Delta and in Fujian Province. Taiwan business people’s 
mainland investment expansion has also penetrated as far as the Bohai Bay, and 
China’s Northeast, Middle and Western regions (See Figure 7). 
 
                                                        
10 Data Source: Yan An. ―Studies on Taiwan Business People’s Investment in the Mainland from the Political and 
Economic Perspective‖ (Yan, 2011). 
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Figure 7 Main Areas of Taiwan Business People’s Mainland Investment from 1991 to 
July 2009
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The three decades of investment by Taiwanese business people in the mainland 
comes as a natural result of economic globalization and regionalization, as directed by 
the market and not subject to artificial human restrictions. The accumulation in these 
many years has not only generated the giant volume of cross-strait trade and 
investment by Taiwanese business people in the mainland, also led to the being of a 
group directly interests closely knitted accordingly - Taiwanese business people, who 
have become an increasingly important new force influencing the direction of 
cross-strait relations. 
 
5.2 The Influence of Taiwanese Business People on the Economies of Both 
Taiwan and the Mainland 
The nearly three decades of investment by Taiwanese business people has not only 
                                                        
11Data Source: Taiwan Office of the State Council PRC. ―Main Areas and Industries of Taiwan’s Mainland 
Investment‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed in December 2011,  
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/tztw/twjmgk/201101/t20110118_1699300.htm. 
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revitalized both economies, but also promoted the institutional development of 
cross-strait economic and trade cooperation. Facts demonstrate that, via their 
investment, Taiwanese business people significantly contributed to creation of a 
win-win situation for both the mainland and Taiwan. 
5.2.1 Promoting Economic Development across the Taiwan Strait  
Taiwan is an island economy, and one which relies to a considerable extent on foreign 
trade for its economic growth. Reference is made in Chapter 4 to the fact that the 
mainland is the greatest source of trade surplus for Taiwan. The giant surplus has not 
only complemented the years of its trade deficit with Japan, but also contributed 
greatly to its 370 billion US dollars of foreign exchange reserves (QQ News, 2010). 
Continuing expansion of Taiwanese exports to the mainland, and Taiwan’s huge trade 
surplus have become major forces driving Taiwan’s economic growth. Statistics 
indicate that 75% of Taiwan’s exports to the mainland occur in enterprises which are 
also active investors in mainland China (Su, 2011). Therefore, Taiwanese business 
people’s enterprises may be characterized as the pillars of Taiwan’s economy. 
Taiwanese scholars also assert that the investment by Taiwanese business people in 
the mainland helps promote the growth of Taiwan’s economy, and create more 
employment opportunities (Li, 2005b). 
In addition, the continuous expansion of investment by Taiwanese business 
people in the mainland has energetically facilitated the upgrading of Taiwan’s 
industrial structures. Taiwan business people have primarily invested in 
manufacturing industries on the mainland. Among the products that Taiwan exports to 
the mainland, the overwhelming majority fall under the categories of materials for 
manufacturing and intermediate products or components (See Figure 8). In particular, 
the proportion of electronic information and mechanical products and their 
components has witnessed a rapidly escalating trend year after year.  
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Figure 8 Main Industries of Taiwan Business People’s Mainland Investment from 
1991 to July 2009
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 Therefore, as a result of moving the labour-intensive industries from Taiwan to 
the mainland, on the one hand, Taiwanese business people have had more capital to 
develop capital intensive and technology intensive industries, creating favourable 
conditions for the upgrading of industrial structure of the Taiwan region. This has 
aided Taiwanese enterprises in shifting from original equipment manufacturing to 
establishing their own brands, and from pursuing cost minimization development 
models to enterprise value maximization models. On the other hand, some 
middle-stream and upper-stream enterprises have produced and exported materials 
and components of high added-value and high technology to supply the 
middle-stream and lower-stream enterprises on the mainland. The middle and 
upper-stream Taiwan enterprises and the middle and lower-stream mainland 
enterprises have formed an internal mode of division of labour within industries. This 
                                                        
12Ibid.  
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model can be described as Taiwanese enterprises exporting intermediate products or 
components for fabrication, produced and sold on the mainland or sold to a third 
country or region (Su, 2011). The establishment of the global operating mode has 
significantly enhanced Taiwan enterprises’ international competitive power.  
In addition, approximately one million Taiwanese business people invest, do 
business or work on the mainland have made remarkable contributions to the 
economic development, employment and technologic upgrading of the mainland (Zhu, 
2004). On April 29, 2005, Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, in his historic 
meeting with Lian Zhan, Chairman of the KMT, stated that ―the construction 
achievements made by the mainland also include the important contributions made by 
Taiwanese compatriots‖ (Xinhua News, 2005). This is an objective and positive 
comment from the CCP on the role of Taiwanese business people. 
The contributions of Taiwanese business people on the mainland occur primarily 
in the following areas: 
Firstly, absorbing foreign investment assumes great weight in the strategy of 
China’s reform and opening. Taiwanese business people are important external 
investors in mainland economic development. Figure 6 has already demonstrated 
Taiwanese business people’s key position as China’s foreign investors, and thus a 
repetition thereof is unnecessary here. 
Secondly, Taiwan business people’s massive mainland investment helps create 
employment opportunities on the mainland. The unemployment problem was grave 
after the mainland adopted a market economy and reformed its state-owned 
enterprises. Taiwan-funded enterprises on the mainland are primarily labour-intensive 
ones that can provide many jobs in those locations where Taiwanese investment 
occurs. According to statistics, the 70,000 already operating Taiwan-funded 
enterprises employ approximately 10 million mainland people. On average, each 
Taiwan-funded enterprise employs about 140 mainland workers. If one adds those 
working on infrastructure construction for Taiwanese enterprises and those providing 
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services to Taiwan business people, the job opportunities provided by Taiwan-funded 
enterprises range approximately from 20 million to 30 million (Yan, 2011). As a result, 
Taiwan business people’s massive mainland investment has made significant 
contributions to the mainland by easing its unemployment pressure. 
Thirdly, Taiwan business people’s mainland investment provides enterprise 
managerial experience and relatively advanced production technologies. Modern 
enterprises cannot develop without advanced enterprise cultures. Scholar Li Fei has 
remarked on the active role of Taiwan business people as follows, ―the clever 
investment creed, mature market views, advanced managerial experience and 
developed operating models of Taiwanese enterprises directly influence local 
managerial personnel, technological workers and ordinary workers employed by 
Taiwan-funded enterprises, but also provide a mode of development from which 
lessons may be drawn. Thus investment by Taiwan business people in the mainland 
fosters a sound economic competition environment that facilitates changes in the 
conditions of the local market economy‖ (Li, 2005a, p.294). Therefore, 
Taiwan-funded enterprises are subjects that mainland enterprises can research and 
learn from. Taiwan-funded enterprises help mainland entrepreneurs broaden their 
horizons, and expand the scope for mainland enterprise to link up with the practices of 
the outside world. 
5.2.2 Promoting Institutional Development of Cross-strait Economic and Trade 
Cooperation 
Affected by political elements, a formal institutional framework, co-established, 
mutually-respected and effectively implemented has always been absent from 
cross-strait economic and trade cooperation since before the thaw in the relationship 
between mainland China and Taiwan. Such cooperation developed swiftly because of 
civil forces, especially Taiwanese business people investing in the mainland. Based on 
blood ties, friendship and hometown ties, business people on both sides across the 
Taiwan Strait have conducted economic and trade exchanges subject to an informal 
and uncertain set of rules in a manner where virtually ―all is conducted in silence‖ 
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(Liu, 2011, p.68). 
However, trade and investment conflicts, open commodity programmes, opening 
schedules and the extent of the opening of any bilateral or multilateral economic ties 
must be resolved via consultation through formal mechanisms (Huaxia News, 2009). 
Consequently, the increasingly active trade spurred both governments to mutually 
adjust their policies so as to facilitate the establishment and development of 
cross-strait economic cooperation models, consultation channels and relevant 
operating rules. 
In November 1992, the SEF and the ARATS reached the ―1992 Consensus‖, for 
the first time opening the path of institutionalization of cross-strait consultation, 
which secretly negotiated the institutionalization of cross-strait economic cooperation 
(Liu, 2011). Afterwards, affected by Taiwan independence activities, cross-strait 
relations deteriorated and institutional negotiations were once even dropped. However 
the continuous increase of interdependence of the mainland and Taiwan economies 
has triggered strong opposition from Taiwanese business people to the mainland 
policy of the Taiwanese authorities which caused deterioration in cross-strait relations 
and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese authorities were compelled to open 
up previously restricted economic programmes. Therefore, although the basis for 
institutional cooperation was mired in stalemate, progress was not completely absent. 
In April 2005, Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP, and Lian Zhan, Chairman of 
the KMT, reached the mutual vision of cross-strait peaceful development. As 
mentioned above, these two cross-strait leaders first proposed that both Parties should 
jointly promote all-out exchanges and create cross-strait economic cooperation 
mechanisms. Top meetings between Hu and Lian thus marked the beginning of 
cross-strait institutional trade cooperation. 
After that, irrespective of whether it was in the ―Cross-strait Civil Elite Forum‖ 
held in Shanghai in September 2005 (Jia, 2005), or in the ―Cross-strait Economic and 
Trade Forum‖ which was successfully held on repeated occasions (Zhao, 2009), 
cross-strait economic cooperative mechanisms were among the core subjects. In June 
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2008, following the recommencement of the negotiation mechanism among the SEF 
and the ARATS, the success of the five-time ―meetings of Jiang Bingkun and Chen 
Yunlin‖ ushered in a new phase in theoretical research into and virtual construction of 
cross-strait economic cooperative mechanisms (Niu, 2009).  
The signing of ECFA was a remarkable achievement during this period, and the 
most glorious page in the history of Taiwanese business people’s promotion of the 
institutional development of cross-strait economic and trade development. Industrial 
circles in Taiwan were even more eager when compared to the already active attitude 
adopted by the KMT in signing ECFA. Because, for the Taiwanese enterprises located 
on the mainland which heavily relied on the import of half-finished products from 
Taiwan, if the mainland did not reduce its tariffs, Taiwanese enterprises on the 
mainland certainly would have had to purchase from other regions. That would not 
only have weakened the links between the mainland and Taiwan, but also affected the 
capability of Taiwanese enterprises to expand on the mainland (Lin, 2009). 
Nevertheless, distressed by the unique political environment of Taiwan, the 
schedule of negotiating ECFA had not been agreed upon, and the KMT and the DPP 
debated what to name the agreement. Thus, many Taiwanese people called out loudly 
in favour of ECFA. Some Taiwanese business people and Taiwanese industrial and 
business groups even paid their own money to publish many advertisements in 
Taiwanese media, stating directly that ECFA was of vital importance to Taiwan. In 
February 2009, six major industrial and business groups, including the Taiwan 
General Association of Business, jointly published a declaration, advising the 
Taiwanese authorities to sign the economic cooperation agreement with the mainland 
as soon as possible, and arguing the advisability of Taiwan first having a ―reduction of 
cross-strait tariffs on key products‖ with the mainland (Sun, 2010). Starting from 
March 2009, Taiwanese business people in Dongguan, Guangdong province, 
delivered speeches in many Taiwanese universities and associations, urging the 
signing of ECFA (Zhou, 2010). Powerfully championed by Taiwanese business people, 
the negotiation schedule for ECFA was agreed upon near the end of 2009, and ECFA 
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was successfully signed in June, 2010. 
The strong demand of Taiwanese business people to invest in the mainland was 
reflected in ECFA. As stated in Chapter 4, ECFA lists the promotion of investment 
cooperation as an important object, including establishing an investment protection 
mechanism, increasing transparency in investment-related regulations, gradually 
reducing restrictions on mutual investment between the two parties, and promoting 
facilitation of investment. These measures may assist Taiwanese business people in 
eliminating the obstacles to investment, shortening the time of application and 
reducing elements of uncertainty. 
 
5.3 The Role of Taiwanese Business People in Cross-Strait Social and Cultural 
Exchanges and Blending 
Since the introduction of familial visits by the Taiwan authorities, the goal of 
Taiwanese visiting the mainland is primarily to visit relatives, travel as tourists and 
visit friends. As cross-strait economic ties become increasingly close, that wave of 
people is gradually being replaced by Taiwanese business people who frequently 
travel across the Taiwan Strait for business and trade. According to statistics published 
by the mainland, as early as 2001, the number of business travellers to the mainland 
far exceeded that of the family visitors and tourists, thus becoming the mainstream of 
travellers from Taiwan to the mainland (Sina News, 2001). According to research 
conducted by two scholars (Zhang & Li, 2005), Taiwanese business people’s 
investment in the mainland has influenced the tendency for Taiwanese to visit the 
mainland and for mainland residents to visit Taiwan. Research reveals that Taiwanese 
mainland investment increases by every 100 million US dollars whenever an 
additional 48,572 Taiwanese visit the mainland, while another 2,312 mainland 
residents visit Taiwan. This in turn demonstrates that such investment significantly 
promotes cross-strait exchanges of personnel. Thus, cultivated by investment by 
Taiwanese business people on the mainland, starting from zero, cross-strait personnel 
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exchanges have undergone a process of rapid increase (See Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 9 Cross-strait Personal Exchange from 1987 to 2010
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Figure 10 Cross-strait Communication from 1987 to 2010
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Furthermore, as cross-strait exchanges among people have become more 
intensive, especially as Taiwanese business people joined these exchange, cross-strait 
marriages have also gradually increased. According to statistics by the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs of the PRC, since the recommencement of cross-strait civilian exchanges 
in 1987, more than 300,000 couples from across the Taiwan Strait have married (Wei, 
                                                        
13 Data Source: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC. ―Statistics about Cross-strait Personal Exchange 
and Communication‖. Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC Website. Accessed in December 2011b, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lajlwl/rywltj/201101/t20110120_1715616.htm. 
14 Ibid. 
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2010). According to statistics by the relevant government agency of Taiwan, the 
number of mainland spouses applying to visit Taiwan had reached to 250,000 persons 
as of January 2008 (Beijing Morning Post, 2008). In addition, as more Taiwanese 
business people visit the mainland and more cross-strait marriages take place, the 
problem of their children’s education becomes more and more pronounced. To avoid 
dividing families, and in response to appeals by Taiwanese business people, the 
mainland has established schools for the children of Taiwanese business people in 
Guangdong, Shanghai and other places in an effort to localize the education of these 
children (Sohu News, 2005). 
In addition, Taiwanese business people investing in and/or doing business on the 
mainland also contribute greatly to the promotion of cross-strait cultural and social 
exchanges. For instance, by using their special identities, some Taiwanese business 
people actively organise mutual exchanges among civilian cultural groups in Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan to publicly introduce the real conditions of the Hong Kong 
and Macau societies, politics, economies, cultures, legal systems, democracies and 
living standards, following the reunification of Hong Kong and Macau with the 
mainland (Shi, 2002). 
It may be clearly seen from the above data and analysis that investment by 
Taiwanese business people in the mainland has greatly enhanced cross-strait civil 
integration, which has already developed from the purely economic to the social level. 
This means that structural changes have replaced quantitative increases in cross-strait 
exchanges and integration in the last two decades. As cross-strait economic 
interdependence increases and investment by Taiwanese business people in the 
mainland grows, it can be expected that such exchanges shall expand in all respects 
and integration in many fields shall reach a new peak. 
 
5.4 The Close Relations among Taiwanese Business People with Both 
Governments across the Taiwan Strait 
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The previous two chapters note that in the context of economic globalization and 
regionalization, relations between nations become closer due to the increasing 
expansion of global trade. To some extent, international relations have already 
progressed into a state of interdependence. Therefore, nations place increasing 
emphasis on their economic relations with others; and economic security is becoming 
increasingly important among the issues of international politics. It may be asserted 
that economic elements have profoundly changed international relations. 
Economic globalization and regionalization primarily rely on the motivation by 
the numerous trans-national corporations active in the global market. Trans-national 
corporations’ international operations have brought about the interdependence of 
economies, which on the one hand has created economic reciprocity among nations, 
and on the other has increased their mutual economic sensitivity. Furthermore, the 
increase in the number of trans-national corporations has blurred the distinction 
between international and internal politics, directly bringing international political and 
economic interactions into the domestic sphere and thus forming the interdependent 
political and economic relations of nations wherein these both enjoy the benefits of 
and limit one another (Li, Luo & Zhao, 2002). According to Interdependence Theory, 
non-state acting entities already have enough economic might and global power to 
influence other acting entities (Song & Chen, 2001). Obviously, trans-national 
corporations are such non-state acting entities. With their huge size and powerful 
economic might, while closely linking the global economy, trans-national corporation 
shave also closely linked the global politics. Political decisions of a nation, whether 
internal or external, shall have effects on the nerves of global politics. Therefore, the 
renowned scholar Robert Gilpin characterizes this era as ―an era of the trans-national 
corporations‖ (Robert Gilpin, 2001, p.161).  
According to the authoritative definition by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, a trans-national corporation means one enterprise that owns 
production facilities in at least two countries. According to the 1996 Investment 
Report of the World Bank, the parent company of a trans-national corporation means 
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―an enterprise that has a fixed amount of equity capital and controls assets owned by 
foreign economic entities‖ (Chen, 1999, p.2). From the above definitions, readers can 
see that the essential nature of a trans-national corporation is to directly invest in 
foreign countries. Thus, for the mainland and Taiwan, Taiwanese business people 
directly investing in the mainland are now playing the role of ―trans-national 
corporations‖ even though Taiwan is not formally recognised as an independent 
country in the world. 
Capital always flow into a safe country because security is the basic prerequisite 
for enterprises to generate profits and benefits, so once invested in a country, capital 
will try to shape a political environment in favour of its interests. For the security of 
their capital and the smooth running of their production and operations, trans-national 
corporations usually submit to administration by the government of the host country, 
lobby and influence the policies of that government according to their own interests in 
order to try their best to forestall political risks between the host country and their 
home country (Grieco & Ikenberry, 2008). Therefore, a kind of complicated relation 
exists among trans-national corporations, their home countries and host countries. On 
the one hand, trans-national corporations are influenced by their home countries and 
host countries, making them passive instruments of policy. On the other hand, 
trans-national corporations fully initiate moves to influence both their home and host 
countries and their bilateral relations through the trans-national corporations’ own 
economic activities (Huang, 2008a). For Taiwanese business people that cross the 
Taiwan Strait this is no exception. Taiwan business people must always deal with the 
complicated relations subsisting between the mainland government and the Taiwanese 
political parties. Taiwan business people not only demand that the mainland provide 
protection, aid, and various preferences and conveniences for their development, but 
also try to induce the Taiwan authorities to change their policies and actions to 
alleviate cross-strait relations, and even adopt methods that run counter to the Taiwan 
authorities in order to win profits. 
5.4.1 Taiwanese Business People and the Mainland Government 
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The mainland government has always had a proactively open and warmly welcoming 
attitude towards investment by Taiwanese business people. This is mainly because of 
the changes in the mainland’s domestic development strategy and the mainland’s 
desire for final reunification between the two sides.  
After the ―Cultural Revolution‖ ended on the mainland in the latter 1970s, it 
urgently needed to re-establish and enhance the basis for the people’s recognition of 
its political authority through economic growth and the raising of living standards. 
Therefore, the mainland gradually established its development strategy that has 
economic construction as its core and adheres to reform and opening-up. Because of 
this strategy, economic interests replaced political interests to a considerable degree as 
the target of pleas by mainland enterprises and individuals. Economic efficiency also 
made itself to a remarkable extent the standard by which to assay the achievements of 
different levels of the mainland government, and thus also resulted in significant 
changes in the political functions of the mainland government. 
At that time, faced with the problems of seriously lacking domestic capital, poor 
technology and want of relevant materials, the mainland was experiencing difficulty 
in developing its economy, and needed large amounts of external investment and 
foreign trade. With Taiwan lying in very close geographical proximity to China, 
Taiwanese business people not only had abundant capital, advanced technology and 
managerial methods, but also strong investment intent stemming from the emotional 
bonds of a common nation with a common history. Thus, the mainland’s welcoming 
Taiwanese business people to invest was a reasonable choice. 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s economic surge was completed during the period 
when Taiwan and the mainland were isolated. As living standards in Taiwan improved, 
Taiwanese increasingly identified with the Republic of China (Taiwan), while their 
identification with the mainland rested merely on historical and cultural links, real 
interests being absent. Therefore, to terminate cross-strait isolation and to achieve 
economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, the mainland has a strong demand for 
investment by Taiwanese business people. The mainland hopes that Taiwan business 
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people’s mainland investment fosters cross-strait trade, and creates common interests 
and destiny for the people of Taiwan and the mainland, so that the Taiwanese people’s 
identification with the mainland may increase. 
Summing up the mainland’s consideration of Taiwan business people’s mainland 
investment, scholar Yan An has concluded that for the mainland, the investment by 
Taiwanese business people not only serves the mainland’s economic construction, but 
also thaws the man-made situation of separation and brings cross-strait peace and 
stability. This may be characterized as win-win (Yan, 2006). Accordingly, consistently 
attracting more, better and larger Taiwanese enterprises to invest in and build factories 
on the mainland so as to help assimilate them as mainland enterprises is the primary 
and consistent content of the mainland’s policies towards Taiwanese business people. 
The ensuing several paragraphs will study Taiwan business people’s special 
relationship with the mainland government from Taiwan’s motivation to invest in the 
mainland.  
After the mainland adopted measures to attract Taiwanese business people, the 
Taiwanese enterprises became subject to intense competitive pressure from the rest of 
the region and the world as European and American countries gradually shifted the 
focus of their foreign trade and investment to the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwanese 
business people generally realized that if they did not actively establish the mainland 
market as their hinterland for economic development, it would prove difficult for 
Taiwan to maintain its competitive advantages in economic globalization and 
regionalization. 
Their level of internationalization is an important factor that maintains and 
improves the competitive capabilities of enterprises. Thus for Taiwanese enterprises, 
especially larger ones, investing in the mainland represents not only an attempt at 
internationalization, but also serves as an important guarantee for Taiwanese 
enterprises to expand their sizes in order to form into world-class trans-national 
corporations. According to the results of research by Taiwanese scholar Li Yang, the 
higher the Taiwanese enterprises’ export proportions are, the more willing are the 
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small-and-medium sized Taiwanese enterprises to directly invest in foreign lands; also, 
making use of low-cost labour forces and following their primary customers are the 
primary motivations to invest outside Taiwan (Li, 2003). The mainland happened to 
satisfy these conditions for investment for three reasons. First, the mainland’s policy 
of economic reform and opening-up provides Taiwan business people with the 
opportunity to investigate the mainland before the investment occurs. Second, the 
mainland boasts an abundant supply of labour, with comparatively low wages and 
production costs. Third, mainland China has a huge market potential which suits 
Taiwanese business people’s preferences for investment (CCTV News, 2003).  
Therefore, although the Taiwan authorities imposed many restrictions on their 
nationals’ investment in the mainland, its low production costs, huge market potential, 
cheap labour, stable political environment and preferential investment policies exerted 
a noteworthy magnetic effect attracting Taiwanese business people’s mainland 
investment. Data further indicates that the selection to invest made by these business 
people was correct. According to statistics, the proportion of profitable Taiwanese 
enterprises on the mainland has always been more than 60%, and that of those 
primarily concentrating on investing and engaging in industrial production 
programmes ran as high as in excess of 70% (Li, 2008). In sum, in order to facilitate 
industrial upgrading and economic internationalization, and to obtain more interests in 
competition, Taiwanese business people actively exploited their special relationship 
with the mainland and their preferential treatment to expand their investment and 
continue to promote cross-strait economic cooperation. 
In addition, according to research by scholars, although there are different 
backgrounds to political parties and political preferences among Taiwanese business 
people currently investing on the mainland, and the proportion of Pan-Blue supporters 
is generally a bit higher than that of Pan-Green supporters, in virtual business 
activities the political preferences of Taiwanese business people are not very marked. 
Taiwan business people’s positions of a specific political party are not obvious either 
(Chen, 2005). Peng Weixue, Director of the General Office, from the Institute of 
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Taiwan Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, once summarized the 
political attitude of Taiwanese business people as politically cold and economically 
hot, and asserted that most Taiwanese business people are very practical and unwilling 
to publicly express their political attitudes (Sun & Chen, 2005). 
This low-profile political attitude prevalent among Taiwanese business people 
casts into prominence the essential characteristics of business professionals, who in 
general primarily focus on survival and profit, and who most urgently need favourable 
policies for their businesses. Mr. Zhang Hanwen, former President of the Dongguan 
Association of Taiwanese business people publicly stated that these are all middle 
voters, who usually care little about Taiwan’s politics and have no particular political 
claims. Taiwan business people are concerned however with whether the Taiwanese 
political leaders can maintain cross-strait peace and stability and whether they 
genuinely seek to maximize the benefits of the people of Taiwan (Liu, Zhang & 
Cheng, 2004). Taiwan business people investing in the mainland clearly realize that if 
tension continues in cross-strait relations their economic interests will be directly 
injured. 
Therefore, although few Taiwanese business people press or express their 
political positions on specific political issues to the Taiwan authorities, most hope that 
decision-makers in both Taiwan and the mainland can maintain peace and stability 
across the Taiwan Strait. Also, Taiwan business people hope to expand cross-strait 
economic and trade exchanges between the two sides. For instance, although 
Taiwanese business people seldom discuss cross-strait political issues, renowned 
entrepreneurs like WANG Yongqing, ZHANG Rongfa and XU Wenlong have all 
expressed their hope that the Taiwan authorities realize cross-strait postal, sea and air 
communications. It was in response to years of calls and urgings by Taiwanese 
business people that the Taiwan authorities had to modify the Regulation on the 
Relations among the People of the Taiwan Region and the Mainland Region, and laid 
down the schedule for direct cross-strait flights (Sun, 2008). 
The above analysis indicates that, even though Taiwanese business people do not 
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favour immediate reunification, they hope cross-strait relations maintain their current 
status quo and peacefulness, so that Taiwan business people can invest and develop in 
a relatively safe and stable political environment. This basically corresponds with the 
objectives of the mainland, which are to seek economic integration and political 
reunification. Therefore, the numerous Taiwanese business people investing in the 
mainland are important forces keeping cross-strait relations developing peacefully and 
stably. As the Taiwanese scholar CHEN Jianzhong asserts, the Taiwanese groups are 
the lubricating oil of cross-strait relations, and even the golden key for Taiwan to open 
the political and economic cage of the mainland (Chen, 2004).  
In sum, the above several paragraphs relate that economic interests alone are the 
greatest impulsion for Taiwan business people to invest in the mainland. However, 
economic and political factors are the main considerations of the mainland 
government on investment by Taiwanese Business People. 
5.4.2 Taiwanese Business People and Taiwan’s Political Parties 
Compared with the agreement between Taiwanese business people and the mainland 
government in their political and economic objectives, the demands of Taiwanese 
business people have always been at odds with the requirements of the Taiwanese 
authorities prior to 2008. First, the political objective of the Taiwan authorities was to 
pursue autonomy to the greatest degree possible. Consequently, the Taiwan authorities 
manifested an oppositional attitude towards the mainland government, which 
conflicted with the peace and stability sought by Taiwanese business people. Second, 
the Taiwan authorities’ political objective has always resulted in corresponding 
economic policies. For instance, the Taiwan authorities’ economic policies such as the 
―Go South Policy‖, the policy of ―patient instead of hasty‖ and Taiwan authorities’ 
actions such as the refusal of the ―postal, sea and air communications‖, stifling 
mainland capital and restricting Taiwanese business people’ investment runs counter 
to the market mechanism. The Taiwanese authorities before Ma Ying-jeou assumed 
the presidency in 2008 were in evident conflict with the wishes of Taiwanese business 
people to actively open cross-strait trade. 
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Therefore, Taiwanese business people investing in the mainland were not what 
the Taiwan authorities fostered, rather what the Taiwan authorities disliked as 
illustrated in above in this chapter. In the view of the Taiwan authorities that opposed 
investment by Taiwanese business people in the mainland, these business people were 
characterised as ―enemies and traitors who empty Taiwan, create black holes in 
Taiwan’s industries, hit the local industries and aid the mainland with their economic 
power‖ (Liu & Gao, 2004). 
Nevertheless, factual evidence demonstrates the irresistible nature of economic 
rules. The measures above taken by the Taiwan authorities not only failed to remove 
the mainland element in Taiwan business people’s economic activities, but also raised 
the extent of cross-strait economic interdependence due to the circumventing tactics 
adopted by Taiwanese business people. Taiwan business people went a step ahead 
these policies, forcing the Taiwanese authorities to gradually loosen certain 
restrictions and recognise the lawfulness of their actions on the mainland. 
Consequently, the economic policies of Taiwan towards the mainland fell into passive, 
negative and defensive positions. 
According to Miao, when the objectives of trans-national corporations disagree 
with the foreign policies of their home country, the government change the actions of 
the firms by administrative means, or the firms lobby the government to amend its 
foreign policies (Miao, 2003). Even though administrative enforcement by the Taiwan 
authorities largely failed to block Taiwanese business people’s investment in the 
mainland, Taiwan business people nevertheless sought to influence Taiwanese 
government policies by such means as voting.  
Taiwan business people gradually realized that, in a global market where cruel 
and fierce competition prevails, as micro subjects in the market, they need the aid of 
government power to clear the obstacles to the internationalization of capital, free 
trade and integration of production while they obey the law of value. Without 
government support, it is impossible for trans-national corporations to win victories in 
global competition. Furthermore, the progress of Taiwan’s democracy provided 
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favourable conditions for Taiwanese business people to intervene in political 
procedures and influence government policies. As a result, to safeguard their 
investment interests on the mainland, Taiwanese business people have altered their 
low-profile political attitude since 2004, and tried to make their impact on Taiwan’s 
politics. For instance, during the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, Taiwanese 
business people in Shanghai and other places initiated the ―Love Hometown 
Programme‖ to call upon Taiwanese business people to go back to Taiwan and vote 
(Sina News, 2004). 
With the size of their population, industries, talent pools and capital, Taiwanese 
business people matter to Taiwan’s politics. Their impact on Taiwanese election of 
political parties is most notable. This is attributable to the following two causes. On 
the one hand, the number of Taiwanese business people groups has been increasing 
day by day. According to statistics, more than one million Taiwanese business people 
have invested in the mainland. These enterprises hire as many as several tens of 
thousands Taiwanese business elites. Also thousands of Taiwanese students study on 
the mainland. Although the proportion of Taiwanese living on the mainland is not 
large relative to Taiwan’s overall population, their capability to wield an influence 
cannot be overrated if the number of their relatives and friends is factored into 
determining their influence (Sun & Chen, 2005). On the other hand, political forces in 
Taiwan are currently quite balanced, and the margin of votes is very small, so every 
vote matters to both the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green parties. Therefore, Taiwanese 
business people who have one million votes are a key minority that influences general 
elections. Taiwan business people are considered one of the most important ―trump 
cards to victory‖ for political parties in Taiwan, even as the ―twenty-sixth county that 
decides the future result of Taiwan’s presidential election‖ (Liu, Zhang & Cheng, 
2004, p.1). 
As their political position continues to grow, Taiwanese business people have 
become subjects that all Taiwanese political parties try to attract and please. The time 
Taiwan business people attracted most attention was in helping the KMT regain 
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power in the 2008 Taiwan presidential election. 
After it gained power, the DPP made few achievements in economic 
development and political construction, continued undermining cross-strait relations, 
and repeatedly obstructed cross-strait postal, sea and air communications. The above 
acts by the DPP resulted in political turbulences within Taiwan and induced 
deterioration of cross-strait relations, while worsening Taiwan’s investment 
environment. In consequence, Taiwanese industrial and commercial circles were 
utterly disappointed by these actions of the DPP, and one after another called for the 
Taiwanese authorities to adopt more pragmatic policies on cross-strait relations (Sina 
News, 2006). That was why in 2008 when the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou declared 
that after he won the election he would loosen the restraints on Taiwanese business 
people’ investment in the mainland, Taiwanese business people were suffused with 
hope for a re-accession to power by the KMT. According to media reports, when 
Taiwan business people attended the ―Mainland Taiwanese Business people Talk‖, 
they directly expressed to Ma Ying-jeou that, ―The only method to help Taiwanese 
business people is for the KMT to definitely regain power in 2008‖ (People’s Daily, 
2007, p.3). In the 2008 Taiwan presidential election, almost 250,000 Taiwanese 
business people went home to vote. Taiwan business people’s desire to vote rose to an 
unprecedented level. Compared with the 150,000 persons voting in 2004 (Zhong & 
Xu, 2008, p.25), it chalked up an increase of almost 1.7 times.  
On Ma Ying-jeou’s victory in 2008, Professor YANG Kaihuang of the 
Mingchuan University of Taiwan explained that the Ma Ying-jeou administration’s 
opinions on cross-strait relations were mutual economic opening, political 
reconciliation within Taiwan, mutual respect between Taiwan and the mainland, and 
the facilitation of peace. These opinions differed very much from Taiwan’s policies in 
the last eight years of the DPP’s imposed self-isolation, which provoked the mainland 
and engendered instability by exploiting public worries. The KMT’s new cross-strait 
policies provided an opportunity for Taiwan to return to equilibrium, to revitalize 
itself, and to embrace globalization after passionate political struggles (Lin, Yang, Lin 
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& Li, 2008). The victory of the KMT in 2008 was thus not merely a victory of the 
Kuomintang, but rather a victory of the people of Taiwan, especially Taiwanese 
business people. After regaining power, the KMT adopted a pragmatic approach to 
actively increase mutual trust and consensus with the mainland. That made possible a 
normal and healthy environment for Taiwanese business people to invest in the 
mainland, so that Taiwan business people could concentrate on running business, 
instead of being sidetracked by political and ideological issues. 
To recap the above analysis, motivated by the investment by Taiwanese business 
people in the mainland, the Taiwan authorities changed their policies towards the 
mainland from forbidding to acquiescing in, and from loosening to regularizing, 
towards the direction of being open and legal. It is not difficult to imagine that, 
without the investment by Taiwanese business people on the mainland, peace and 
stability between the mainland and Taiwan could not have been possible. 
It is undeniable that it is the increasing cross-strait economic interdependence 
and the promotion of Taiwanese business people behind the policies that make 
possible the continual advancement of cross-strait relations. Even when the forces for 
Taiwan Independence were wreaking their worst, the mainland maintained the highest 
degree of rationality. In the words of SU Qi, the former director of the Mainland 
Affairs Council of Taiwan, the current cross-strait political trend is ―to unite the 
non-political elements and surround the political elements‖ (Sun & Chen, 2005).  
Summary  
A scholar commented that ―[E]ven if economic integration does not make political 
agreements superfluous, it lays the foundation for political agreements‖ (Wang, 1999b, 
p.415). Thus, though cross-strait economic cooperation and recognition does not 
directly create political reunification; maintaining the long-term stable and close 
economic exchanges is tantamount to maintaining the stable communication and close 
exchanges between the mainland and Taiwan which establish a solid edifice for peace 
and stability across the Taiwan Strait (Shan, 2009). This point can be illustrated by the 
  79 
fact that Taiwanese business people’ investment in the mainland facilitates cross-strait 
social, cultural and political exchanges and integration. It is safe to assert that the 
economic activities of Taiwanese business people’ investing in the mainland not only 
lays a solid material foundation to the integration state of ―I in you and you in me‖, 
but also improves the mutual recognition of the people across the Taiwan Strait, as 
well as shaping an active and harmonious environment for cross-strait political 
exchanges. Therefore, Taiwanese business people are an important element for 
cross-strait peace and stability. 
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Chapter 6 Mainland China's New Policy towards Taiwan 
Introduction 
Whether in terms of their aggregate economies
15
 or respective military strength
16
, 
there can be no doubt whatsoever that mainland China enjoys an overwhelming 
advantage over Taiwan in the cross-strait situation. Accordingly, understanding the 
mainland’s policy towards Taiwan and analyzing its effects form the focal points of 
this research on the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. 
On New Year’s Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress issued the Message to Taiwan Compatriots, thereby enshrining the peaceful 
development of cross-strait relations at the core of its reunification policy. During the 
30 year interval since its issue, in the first decade, the two sides broke free from their 
state of long-term isolation and established economic, trade and cultural exchanges; in 
the second decade, the ―Wang-Koo talks‖ were held and the two sides reached the 
1992 Consensus. This laid the political foundation for cross-strait exchanges. In the 
third decade, the two sides activated negotiations geared toward achieving the ―Three 
Direct Links‖ and inaugurated direct talks between the CCP and the KMT, - the first 
since the final rift gaped open between Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek 50-odd 
years before. These developments have significantly improved cross-strait relations
（Li, 2009, p.82）. Therefore, the Message to Taiwan Compatriots has performed a 
                                                        
15 As announced by the PRC Bureau of Statistics, the mainland’s 2010 GDP was 39.7983 trillion RMB, about 6.04 
trillion US dollars. Taiwan reported its GDP in 2010 as 136144.15 trillion NTD, which according to Taiwan’s 
official exchange rate, was 430.451 billion US dollars in total. 
Mainland Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics China. ―Report on the Social and Economic Achievements 
during the 11th Five Year Plan‖. National Bureau of Statistics China Website. Accessed January 2012, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?searchword=%B9%FA%C4%DA%C9%FA%B2%FA%D7%DC%D
6%B5&channelid=6697&record=65.   
Taiwan Data Source: China Economic and Social Development Database. ―Social and Economic Indicators with 
oRespect t Taiwan‖. China Economic and Social Development Website. Accessed January 2012, 
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/navi/result.aspx?id=N2011060008&file=N2011060008000254&floor=1.   
16
 In May 2006, Chinese Military Strength Report published by the US Department of Defence concedes that 
"cross-strait military strength was gradually tilting towards Beijing", and "had caused regional unbalance". The 
report of the Defence Research Institute of Japan also avers that the cross-strait "military strength comparison is 
becoming more and more favourable to mainland China". The analysis and forecast of the Ministry of National 
Defence of Taiwan even deemed that, between 2010 and 2012 "the military strength of CPC would have an 
absolute advantage in all respects (Fan, 2008, p.54).  
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key historical function in the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. It not 
only marks a significant adjustment and transformation of mainland China’s policy 
towards Taiwan - thus creating the necessary prerequisite and safe environment for 
terminating cross-strait military confrontation and realizing cross-strait 
communications - but also later became the mainland’s basic guiding principle and 
policy towards Taiwan. China’s peaceful reunification thereby became the leitmotif 
and mantra of the mainland's policy towards resolving the Taiwan issue. 
Hu Jintao's speech at the conversazione held in commemoration of the 30
th 
anniversary of the issue of the Message to Taiwan Compatriots at the end of 2008 
encapsulated a summary of the CCP’s policy towards Taiwan over the previous 30 
years. Hu’s speech not only brought up a series of new discussions and proposals for 
promoting peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait, but also represented an 
innovation in the mainland's Taiwan policy during the period of peaceful development 
of cross-strait relations. Therefore, Hu’s speech was regarded as embodying the 
mainland's latest policy towards Taiwan (Yan, 2009). This chapter will analyze the 
trend in cross-strait relations by interpreting Hu Jintao's new policy towards Taiwan. 
 
6.1 The Core of Hu Jintao's Speech: Mainland's Implementing "Peaceful 
Development" Policy towards Taiwan 
Hu Jintao expresses the idea that in order to develop cross-strait relations, mainland 
Chinese must firmly grasp the theme of peaceful development across the Taiwan 
Strait. Hu Jintao said ―We must adhere to the principle that mainland and Taiwan 
belong to one China as the political foundation upon which to promote peaceful 
development across the Taiwan Strait. We must set deepening communication and 
cooperation, as well as promoting consultation and negotiation, as important 
approaches to advance peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait. We must also 
posit encouraging cross-strait compatriots to struggle in unity as the powerful driving 
force for promoting cross-strait peaceful development‖(Hu, 2009, p.6). Only if both 
sides make progress together, pull together and work hard as a team, can the mainland 
and Taiwan open up a new prospect for the peaceful development of cross-strait 
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relations. 
In addition to comprehensively expounding the ideal of peaceful development of 
cross-strait relations, Hu offered six recommendations targeting that end. Hu’s six 
proposals are as follows, ―to adhere to the One China Principle and enhance political 
mutual trust; to boost economic cooperation and promote common development; to 
carry forward Chinese culture and strengthen spiritual bonds; to enhance personal 
exchanges and expand communications among all walks of life; to maintain the 
sovereignty of the state and consult on foreign affairs; to end the hostile confrontation 
and reach an agreement for peace‖ (Hu, 2009, p.6-7).  
 
6.2 Interpreting Mainland's "Peaceful Development" Policy towards Taiwan 
In general, on the one hand the "peaceful development" policy reflects the continuity 
of the mainland's policy towards Taiwan, in accordance with the peaceful 
reunification principle established in the Message to Taiwan Compatriots. On the 
other hand, this policy realistically confronts the cross-strait status quo, and has thus 
achieved breakthroughs in many respects. The mainland’s peaceful development 
policy towards Taiwan seems more pragmatic, more flexible and more self-confident. 
According to statistics, in Hu Jintao’s 5067 word speech, he mentions "development" 
61 times, "peace" 52 times and "peaceful development" 29 times in total. Hu, as the 
president of the PRC, his high frequency of mentioning ―peaceful development‖ to 
some extent demonstrates the mainland’s goodwill to Taiwan and the mainland’s 
sincere attitude towards cross-strait peaceful development. Consequently, some 
mainland scholars hold that the focus of the CCP’s work on Taiwan has shifted from 
"fighting against independence and promoting reunification" to "fighting against 
independence, promoting peace, and achieving gradual reunification" (China News, 
2008). 
 
6.2.1 The Target of the Mainland's "Peaceful Development" Policy towards 
Taiwan: Realizing Cross-Strait Peaceful Reunification 
The renowned Chinese scholar Fei Xiaotong in the book Jiangcun Economy, as also 
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his doctoral dissertation of London University in 1938, stated that China was unable 
to bear any more wastage of wealth and energy caused by mistakes. While, in order to 
avert errors, Fei explicitly noted that Chinese people must arrive at correct 
interpretations or analyses of the situations or conditions; otherwise, even though 
China harbours the best of intentions and the most ideal of objectives, plans were 
bound to miscarry if premised upon initial false understandings and perspectives with 
regard to the changing environment (Fei, 2001).  
With the continuous amalgamation and development of the global economy, the 
interdependency among all countries has increased greatly, producing a situation in 
which a slight move in one part may affect the entire tableau. Cooperation and 
confrontation between countries is thus becoming more complex. As Neoliberalist 
theory and Interdependent theory hold, countries of the world will make great 
exertions to explore cooperation and communication with one another, avoid the 
"Zero-Sum Phenomenon" occasioned by conflicts, and pursue "win-win" peaceful 
development. Furthermore, pursuing global cooperation has also become a common 
goal in the international community, while peace and development have become the 
theme of the times. 
After the great upheaval of "the Cultural Revolution" ended in 1979, the 
mainland shifted its national strategic emphasis to economic construction, and it 
began to implement reform and opening-up policies, while also continuing its 
adherence to the policy of employing peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue. The 
mainland’s choice came not only as a result of the urgent need for a stable 
international environment as a necessary predicate for domestic economic 
construction, but it also complied with the cross-strait populace's expectations for 
peace and development. More importantly, pursuing peaceful means to solve the 
Taiwan issue was a positive response to the new international situation. The 
achievements realised during China's 30 years of reform and opening in the economic, 
social and other fields, as well as the notable improvement of cross-strait relations, 
have also effectively validated mainland China’s policy of peace. 
Although the current possibility of a deterioration in the relationship or even the 
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outbreak of war between the mainland and Taiwan is low, the historical review of 
cross-strait relations in Chapter Two herein demonstrates that, if not handled properly, 
some setbacks and reversals might again arise respecting the Taiwan issue as had been 
the case in the past few decades across the Taiwan Strait. The choice between peace 
and war is the ultimate and most extreme choice for both the mainland and Taiwan. If 
war broke out between the two sides, the mainland might forfeit a stable environment 
within which to advance its economic construction, and Taiwan might have to face 
threats to its security or even survival. Therefore, considering the cost relation 
between risks and benefits, such a bipolar choice, black or white, leaving no room for 
manoeuvre, is neither reasonable nor economical for either side, given their high 
degree of economic interdependency. As Interdependency Theory emphasises, for a 
country with high interdependency or extensive opening-up, the inducement to 
provoke war or conflicts that might damage economic associations is low in these 
countries or regions because of the huge opportunity and adjustment costs 
(Rosecrance, 1986). As demonstrated above, both the mainland and Taiwan need a 
stable environment for their economic development, especially the mainland. Peaceful 
reunification remains the key mantra of the mainland's policy towards Taiwan. 
The Taiwan issue traces its roots to the Chinese Civil War. According to Lu 
Xinjian and Fan Qianfeng, the mainland's standpoint is that the Taiwan issue is an 
exclusive matter of China's internal affairs. In interpreting the term ―China‖, in fact, 
both the mainland and Taiwan concedes that they are legally an indivisible part of 
China. From this point of view, the mainland and Taiwan never legally split (Lu & 
Fan, 2010, p.79). Therefore, mainland scholar Zhang Nianchi deems that since there 
is no disunion, there can be no unification, that any supposed "reunification" now is a 
mere reconciliation of the two sides (Yu, Cheng, Wang, Huang & Zhang, 2010, p.10). 
Such scholars’ opinions happen to coincide with the message expressed by the 
mainland's policy of "Peaceful Development". The essence of "Peaceful 
Development" policy is transferring the mainland's Taiwan strategy from the model of 
the central government imposing reunification on the local Taiwan authority to the 
model of working together to promote reunification on the basis of equality, 
  85 
reconciliation and cooperation between the two sides. Obviously, the mainland's 
authority has become entrenched, having transited intact through the past sixty years 
of political hostility and social separation, a political scheme or a peace agreement is 
no longer the optimum method to definitively resolve the Taiwan issue once and for 
all. A lack of common interest and experience is a very important cause of the 
previous cross-strait estrangement and governmental separation. Consequently, 
resolving the Taiwan issue presents more a problem of reconstructing national 
identification and rebuilding ethnic identification. The reconstruction of national 
identification across the Taiwan Strait requires both sides to develop a sense of a 
common heritage, and to enhance mutual trust, as well as a collective identity forged 
via means of cross-strait collaborative development. In sum, though peaceful 
reunification is undoubtedly the target both sides across the Taiwan Strait pursue, the 
process is far more important than the result. In other words, people should transform 
the pursuit for reunification into a process of cross-strait mutual development.  
As mentioned in Chapter Four herein, when discussing ECFA's significance in 
establishing institutional consultation mechanisms for both sides, the practical 
significance of the two sides' signing the "Confrontation Termination Treaty" or 
"Cross-Strait Peace Treaty" exists. However, the need to sign such treaties is no 
longer the task of highest priority when contrasted against the current cross-strait 
momentum of great communication, great cooperation and great development. The 
mainland has repeatedly stressed the importance of both sides enhancing common 
economic interests and cultivating a common memory of history, culture, economy 
and politics (The Central People’s Government of China News, 2011), which clearly 
demonstrates the mainland's wish to provide platforms and opportunities for mutual 
amalgamation and reconstruction of identification through cross-strait peaceful 
development. It is a logical inference that, if the CCP can successfully play a leading 
role in such communication, cooperation, development and amalgamation between 
the mainland and Taiwan in future decades, cross-strait relations might undergo a 
qualitative transformation and many concerns that people now confront might be 
readily solved. 
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6.2.2 The Political Basis for the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations: 
the One China Principle 
The One China Principle is the baseline of the mainland’s policy towards Taiwan, and 
it has never changed. The newest explanation of the connotation of the One China 
Principle is:  
―There is only one China in the world. China's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity tolerate no division. Since 1949, though the reunification of the 
mainland and Taiwan has not been achieved, this situation is by no means 
tantamount to a partitioning of China's territory and sovereignty. The past six 
decades’ separation is a mere political confrontation which is a relic inherited 
from the Chinese Civil War in the middle and latter 1940s of the previous 
century. The long separation across the Taiwan Strait does not change the fact 
that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one Greater China‖ (Hu, 2009, p.7).  
In contrast to the expression of the previous One China Principle, which is that 
―there is only one China, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and the 
government of the PRC is the only legal government of China‖ (The Central People’s 
Government of China News, 2005), in its current formulation, the One China 
Principle appears more flexible and inclusive since it explicitly characterises the 
cross-strait issue as being one of governmental authority, rather than one of 
sovereignty. Thus it reinvigorates the stagnancy of cross-strait relations after the 
publishing of Lee Teng-hui’s Two States Theory and lays the foundations for 
restarting cross-strait relations. The new expression further sets the mainland and 
Taiwan on an equal footing, accords equal status and treatment to Taiwan, and is thus 
much more readily comprehensible by and acceptable to the Taiwanese.  
With regard to these expansions of the connotations of the One China policy, Hu 
Jintao further avers: ―If the two sides can reach a common cognition and a consensual 
viewpoint concerning the implementation of the One China principle, we will hold the 
cornerstone to construct an edifice of political mutual trust between the mainland and 
Taiwan. Thus, everything would be subject to discussion.‖ (Hu, 2009, p.6). 
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Consequently, after the CCP manifested a conciliatory and positive posture towards 
Taiwan, it is logical to understand why cross-strait relations could have so quickly and 
significantly improved after the Ma Ying-jeou administration conceded the ―1992 
Consensus‖ and announced its adherence to the One China Principle. 
Notwithstanding the above, however, the political divergence between the two 
sides remains evident. Although Ma Ying-jeou advocates the ―1992 Consensus‖ 
which incorporates the One China Principle, yet the One China to which Ma’s 
administration pledges its adherence to refers to the ROC. From Ma’s government’s 
point of view, the ROC lies solely within the island of Taiwan, and thus excludes the 
mainland (Chen, 2008). This standpoint has altered the original Kuomintang 
reunification strategy, to that the ROC should include both Taiwan and the mainland. 
The Kuomintang’s new ―1992 Consensus‖ attempted to split the ROC and the 
mainland and to sever the connection between Taiwan and the mainland. To some 
extent, the Kuomintang’s new ―1992 Consensus‖ approaches quite near to the idea of 
Taiwanese Independence. However, under the framework of the Constitution of the 
ROC, Taiwan maintains that it will neither resort to the use of force, nor declare 
independence or reunification. For the mainland, the current Ma administration’s 
standpoint is greatly more palatable than the outright advocacy of independence. 
Furthermore, Ma Ying-jeou's government has also repeatedly announced that against 
the backdrop of the current acceleration of the globalization process, any attempt to 
ensure democracy and the prosperity of the economy and society by separatist 
activities is undesirable. Also, Taiwanese independence is not the only way to achieve 
Taiwanese democracy and economic prosperity. According to Ma, Taiwan should 
open up as much as possible, and try to arrive at reconciliation with the Mainland so 
as to build a platform for mutual negotiations and communication (Shen, 2009). 
Additionally, after Ma took office, the endeavours he undertook to promote 
cross-strait economic communication and cooperation have also held forth good 
prospects for peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait. With the increasing 
implementation of ECFA, communication and cooperation in business, trade, culture 
and other aspects of life between people across the Taiwan Strait will go deeper and 
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deeper. Mutual understanding between the two sides will improve and prejudice will 
weaken. Thus, an effective and applicable way may be hit upon for resolving the 
Taiwan issue. 
However, one problem which cannot be ignored is that currently at this stage of 
dealing with cross-strait economic issues, both sides admittedly may resort to the 
employment of ―interpretation by both sides‖ as the important means for and 
foundation of cross-strait compromise and interaction. However, in the future course of 
dealing with cross-strait political issues, ―interpretation by both sides‖ may eventually 
beget perplexity or even form an insuperable paradox which may hinder the future 
development of cross-strait relations. The scheme of ―One China, respective 
interpretations‖ and the explanation of "the ROC" proposed by Ma Ying-jeou do not 
necessarily imply the discovery of a unique type of Taiwanese identity jointly 
recognized by both sides. On the contrary, to some extent the scheme of ―One China, 
respective interpretations‖ and its explanation by the ROC have exacerbated 
cross-strait complexities and caused new divergences to appear with regard to Taiwan's 
identity for both the mainland and Taiwan.  
In fact, the high degree of cross-strait economic interdependence and trade links 
has induced both sides’ political differences to narrow ever more. Both the mainland 
and Taiwan are approaching the baseline of their respective policies. In the event of a 
significant increase in the probability of political conflict, how the two sides explore 
the feasibility of tolerance and so arrive at a fundamental direction and method with 
which to eliminate cross-strait political deadlock and the predicaments inherent in the 
legal framework of one China will be a test of the political wisdom of the cross-strait 
governments. Because the mainland government’s expansion of and amendment to the 
connotation of the One China Principle obviously conveys a well-intended message of 
reconciliation to the Taiwanese authorities from the standpoint of adherence to the One 
Chin Principle, it is thus undoubtedly beneficial to the peace and stability across the 
Taiwan Strait. 
 
6.2.3 A Method of Peaceful Development across the Taiwan Strait: Deepening 
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Cross-strait Social and Economic Exchanges and Cooperation 
The foregoing exposition has shown that the mainland’s peaceful reunification policy 
towards Taiwan is largely influenced by the economic construction which lies at the 
national strategic core. It is said that in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping once remarked: 
―Cross-strait economic relations shall realize the goal that there is something of each in 
the other, and neither can survive without the other, and thus attempts at Taiwanese 
independence will present [its proponents with] a tough nut to crack‖.17 Reviewing the 
past 30 years’ cross-strait development, this statement is concise as well as 
comprehensive. Deng Xiaoping’s remark about cross-strait relations holds 
programmatic instructional significance for the mainland's Taiwan policy. The 
mainland’s Taiwan policy has always emphasised the importance of cross-strait 
economic and trade exchanges, and insisted ―that political differences should not affect 
or interfere with cross-strait economic cooperation‖ and ―that no matter under what 
circumstances mainland Chinese shall earnestly safeguard all the legitimate rights and 
interests of Taiwanese business people‖ (People’s News, 2002). 
The mainland’s policy of hoping to achieve collaborative development and realize 
China’s reunification by means of cross-strait economic integration has also achieved 
relative success. In 2008, Hu Jintao observed in a speech commemorating the 30th 
anniversary of the Message to Taiwan Compatriots that ―30 years’ practice has fully 
proven that the fundamental Taiwan policy formulated and implemented by our 
mainland conforms to the tide of the times and the historical trend. The mainland’s 
Taiwan policy grasps fundamental national interests and the state’s core interests. The 
frequent contacts between compatriots across the Taiwan Strait, the intimate economic 
relationship, active cultural exchanges and the extensive common benefits between the 
mainland and Taiwan are unprecedented" (Hu, 2009, p.5). 
From the course of cross-strait economic and trade exchanges summarized in 
Chapters Four and Five herein, one may see that the development of the cross-strait 
                                                        
17 The authenticity of this remark remains to be verified, and it cannot be verified in the publication of Deng 
Xiaoping's Thoughts. Mainland scholars do not a give clear indication of provenance when citing this remark. 
However, this remark is widely known – albeit apocryphal - as Deng Xiaoping’s remarks about the essence of 
cross-strait relations even with the lack of a background to and specific time for this observation.   
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economy and trade over a long period have depended the evolution of cross-strait 
political relations. In the past decades, cross-strait relations have presented an 
apparent instability because of the political isolation between the mainland and Taiwan. 
Nowadays, it is undeniable that, with the continual deepening of the cross-strait 
economic and trade development, the political influence on cross-strait relations is 
correspondingly eroding. The development of a cross-strait economy and trade also 
infuses serious negative effects into the development of cross-strait political relations. 
For example Taiwanese business people resorted to circuitous means to flood into the 
mainland to invest even though by so doing they disregarded restriction from the 
Taiwanese authorities. Due to the impact of Taiwan business people’s insistence on 
investing in the mainland, various restrictions on such investment decreed by the 
Taiwanese powers that forced these restrictions to attenuate until, cross-strait 
economic and trade activities engaged by Taiwan business people eventually became 
sanctioned and the scope of cross-strait economic and trade exchanges thus escalated. 
Various policies formulated by the Taiwan authorities to impose restrictions on 
cross-strait economic development and trade from consideration of political factors 
suffered assaults from various factors, particularly economic ones. Therefore the 
Taiwan government’s policy of imposing restrictions on cross-strait trade is 
increasingly difficult to implement and the effects have also been greatly reduced. 
Moreover, the economic incentive to sign ECFA proves this point further. The high 
degree of cross-strait economic interdependence compels the Taiwan authority to 
realize that further normalization of the deviant cross-strait economic relations is more 
valuable than further liberalization of the economic relations with other countries or 
regions. 
In addition, the personnel, social and cultural exchanges impelled by cross-strait 
economic and trade exchanges also indicate that the mainland’s Taiwan policy of 
"People first, rather than governments; Economy first, rather than politics‖ is a wise 
move. When discussing the role of Taiwanese business people in cross-strait social and 
cultural exchanges and integration, Chapter Five of this thesis notes that Taiwanese 
investment in the mainland deepens cross-strait nongovernmental integration. The 
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trend of cross-strait integration has developed from an economic level to a social level. 
It is predictable that with the improvement of cross-strait economic interdependency 
and the increase of Taiwanese investment, cross-strait exchanges will be in full swing, 
and the integration of various fields will reach new heights. With the help of cross-strait 
economic interdependence, the mainland has succeeded in promoting the formation of 
significant cross-strait exchanges, cooperation and development.  
It is in this context that the mainland is advancing the establishment of a 
cross-strait community of destiny. The mainland’s expression of a cross-strait 
community of destiny indicates that the mainland will continue to promote cross-strait 
exchanges and cooperation, continue to impel the three direct links, and continue to 
boost the emotional integration of people across the Taiwan Strait. The mainland will 
also deepen cross-strait cooperation, appeal to both sides to negotiate a formal end to 
cross-strait hostility, reach a peaceful agreement on the basis of the One China Principle, 
and to construct the framework for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. 
Although the Taiwan authorities still shy from political negotiations, the successful 
signing of ECFA, which belongs to the economic field, actually indicates that 
cross-strait relations have entered into a new stage of institutional consultation and 
negotiation. ECFA itself has thus long since transcended its mere economic 
significance.  
Therefore, economic interdependence is undoubtedly a key factor which pushes 
forward the development of cross-strait relations. Historically cross-strait economic 
and trade relationship have never been a unitary economic problem, but one with a 
deep tinge of politics from start to finish. There is no denying that to conclude 
cross-strait relations are peaceful and stable from the high economic interdependence 
between mainland China and Taiwan is a biased and distorted view. Moreover, the 
current economic interdependence between mainland China and Taiwan is in a state of 
extreme asymmetry since Taiwan has long reaped a huge trade surplus from its trade 
with mainland China. There are two circumstances that dictate that the scope of 
cross-strait economic and trade cooperation will shrink and become limited, and the 
depth of cross-strait economic and trade cooperation will certainly contract. Firstly, 
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when the international economic situation deteriorates and domestic economic 
difficulties crop up, the mainland tends to terminate its preferential policies towards 
Taiwan. Secondly, when Taiwan does not return its goodwill in spite of the mainland’s 
concessive and preferential policies towards Taiwan, the mainland is forced to adopt a 
more circumspect attitude towards these preferential policies favouring Taiwan.  
However people are willing to believe that cross-strait economic interdependence 
will continually improve cross-strait relations in the light of the past 30 years’ 
cross-strait economic and trade exchanges, the practice of social integration, and the 
current trend of smooth development. After six decades of development, cross-strait 
relations are now not merely a matter of emotion and identity, but implicate the more 
prominent problem of economic interests for many negotiations relating to interests. 
Therefore, the development of cross-strait economic and trade exchanges, on the one 
hand, lays a solid material foundation and provides a strong economic momentum for 
peaceful cross-strait development. On the other hand, cross-strait economic 
development promotes people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges across the 
Taiwan Strait, and enhances mutual trust between the two sides. Therefore 
strengthening cross-strait economic relations assumes the guise of a possible 
preparation for further development of future political negotiations between the 
mainland and Taiwan. 
 
6.2.4 The Impetus of Peaceful Cross-Strait Development: Relying on the 
Taiwanese Masses  
Mainland China adheres to the theory of Marxism and Marxism is still taught and used 
by many officials and scholars. Mainland China holds the view that people create 
history so that any ruling authority must secure the people’s support to stabilise its 
regime. In accordance with this tenet of Marxist theory, the mainland has always 
attached great importance to the Taiwanese role in promoting cross-strait reunification. 
The Message to Taiwan Compatriots renders it evident that mainland China feels 
bound to set great hopes on ordinary Taiwanese people to achieve cross-strait 
reunification.  
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However, reviewing the work the mainland has done vis-a-vis Taiwan affairs in the 
past few years, one discovers that the mainland’s efforts towards reunifying Taiwanese 
and mainlanders have had but limited effect, and even the negative effect of recruiting 
support for the Taiwanese regime. This type of opposite effect found its primary 
expression in serious disagreements over national identity, and a complex mentality of 
whether to support independence or one in favour of reunification. 
At present, the national identity of the Taiwanese presents a tableau of alienation 
or diversification. Most Taiwanese acknowledge they are Chinese, but the Chinese 
people who live in the ROC are all in Taiwan. A small minority opposes the name the 
―ROC‖ and wishes to change it because they think the ROC is a non-existent entity, 
and that it is the PRC, rather than the ROC, that is internationally recognised. Some 
Taiwanese consider their national identity to be best expressed under the label 
―Republic of Taiwan‖. And some people agree with the statement that the ROC is in 
Taiwan. People who identify the ROC with Taiwan believe it has nothing at all to do 
with the mainland. As against the PRC, the ROC is consistently regarded as an 
independent sovereign state by Taiwanese political parties and the masses. 
This hybrid national identity of Taiwanese has also influenced their attitude 
towards cross-strait reunification or independence, and generated a complex and 
almost schizophrenic state of mind. Taiwanese attitudes towards reunification or 
independence present an olive shape, being small at both ends and big in the middle. 
That is to say, there are few people who support outright independence or who are in 
favour of reunification, while the majority of Taiwanese favour maintaining the status 
quo (Xie, Dang, Jin, Zeng, Wu, & Yang, 2006). Most Taiwanese are willing to decide 
to support unification or independence according to the shifting winds of circumstance. 
Not only the masses, but the political parties as well tend to uphold the status quo. 
In the face of such a situation, the CCP also realises the urgency of obtaining the 
support of the Taiwanese masses. Therefore, the mainland has repeatedly stressed that 
the 23 million Taiwanese are the mainland’s blood kin, and constitute an important 
force for the development of cross-strait economic and cultural exchanges and the 
expansion of personnel exchanges which represent a significant force countering 
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Taiwan separatist forces (Sohu News, 2003). In 2008, President Hu Jintao has noted 
once again that mainland Chinese should hew to a people-oriented approach, relying on 
Taiwanese policy in implementing the daily work of Taiwan affairs. Mainland Chinese 
should not only understand, trust and care about Taiwanese people, but also know their 
wishes and needs. Moreover, mainland Chinese should ease their difficulties and allay 
their anxieties, passionately provide more practical and beneficial services for people 
from Taiwan, protect their legitimate rights and interests in accordance with law, and 
widely unite Taiwanese to promote the peaceful development of cross-strait relations 
(Hu, 2009, p.7). 
The alienation pervading the Taiwanese national identity is largely due to the 
long-term isolation between the mainland and Taiwan. Long-term isolation and 
separation across the Taiwan Strait, together with both the hostile policy of toward one 
another of the ruling authorities have spawned Taiwanese’s unique collective national 
identity (Hu, 2006). Although the mainland has now adjusted and completely altered 
its hostile policy towards Taiwan, as against 30 years ago, in Taiwan, from the 
administration of Lee Teng-hui to that of Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese government 
has constantly bucked the trend of cross-strait peaceful development and advocated 
Taiwanese independence. Past Taiwanese authorities’ anti-reunification and 
pro-interdependence behaviour has rendered cross-strait relations even more complex 
to handle.  
Therefore, another angle from which to demonstrate the mainland’s reliance on 
the mass Taiwanese policy is that the Chinese government should in the first instance 
confront the differences subsisting between the two sides in terms of their social 
systems and their differing values which come as a result of this long-term isolation. 
In order to elicit the support of the masses of Taiwanese, great efforts should be 
undertaken to break free from the state of isolation between the two sides, let 
Taiwanese really understand the present situation in the mainland, and understand the 
meaning of mainland China’s peaceful development policy. Hence, the mainland’s 
espousal of the view that people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are close flesh and 
blood and share a common destiny. Both sides across the Strait must cultivate common 
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memories of history, culture, economics, and politics by promoting common economic 
interests. Obviously, the Mainland wants to promote non-governmental and personnel 
exchanges through cross-strait economic and trade contacts. As a result, the goal of 
eliminating misunderstanding between people on both sides of the Strait - especially 
the Taiwanese - by will be achieved enhancing mutual trust and a sense of collective 
identity and shared destiny  
The CCP’s policy of relying on the Taiwanese and strengthening cross-strait 
economic ties is considered a successful policy because the economy has always 
played an effective role in implementing the mainland’s Taiwan policy. Previous 
improvement and development in the cross-strait relationship was largely promoted by 
the mainland’s proactive policy towards Taiwan. More importantly, the mainland’s 
policies that benefit Taiwanese business people have also produced a good effect. As 
Chapter Five of the thesis argues, Taiwanese business people who are active in 
promoting the relationship not only constitute the principal body for cross-strait 
economic and trade exchanges, but also are the messengers for cross-strait exchanges 
and communications. A large number of Taiwan business people play an important 
role in reducing misunderstanding and enhancing mutual trust on both sides. The 
economic and social effects produced by Taiwanese business people’s mainland 
investment have been exactly on a par with the mainland government’s expectations. 
Massive mainland investment by Taiwan business people has not only laid a solid 
material foundation for the fusion represented by ―you in me, and me in you‖ as Deng 
Xiaoping anticipated and improved the sense of identity of people on both sides across 
the Taiwan Strait, but has also created a positive and harmonious consultative 
environment for cross-strait political exchanges. 
Certainly not all Taiwanese can visit the mainland, so the number of Taiwanese 
business people is always limited. Therefore, the mainland on the one hand has tried 
hard to promote cross-strait institutional economic collaboration. For instance, despite 
the limited benefits which the mainland has gleaned from ECFA, the mainland still 
actively promoted its signing, and has further devised many preferential policies for 
Taiwan. The mainland’s active attitude towards signing ECFA was consistent with its 
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hope of sacrificing part of it national interests to support Taiwanese farmers, and small 
and medium-sized enterprises in order to gain their support. On the other hand, by 
making full use of the convenient traffic conditions due to the achievement of the three 
direct links, both the mainland and Taiwan have actively developed cross-strait tourism. 
More Taiwanese can have the opportunity to visit the mainland and personally learn of 
the changes in and development of the mainland following the realization of direct air, 
sea and postal services.  
In summary, the mainland actively promotes cross-strait economic and cultural 
exchanges to benefit Taiwanese, pushes forward the three direct links, and continually 
implements and enriches its policies targeting Taiwanese people in the hope of 
coalescing people’s hearts and deepening a cross-strait collective identity. A mutual 
recognition based on common interests and memories can provide the most solid 
spiritual levee to contain the separatist trend, thicken the unity of will, and eliminate 
political differences. 
 
Summary  
This chapter mainly focuses on the mainland’s new policy towards Taiwan, known as 
the peaceful development policy. CCP president Hu Jintao’s speech to the 
conversazione held in commemoration of the 30
th 
anniversary of the issue of the 
Message to Taiwan Compatriots at the end of 2008 is not only a summary of the 
CCP’s policy towards Taiwan over the past 30 years, but also regarded as mainland 
China’s newest policy towards Taiwan. This chapter analyzes the target of the 
mainland’s peaceful development policy towards Taiwan as the realization of final 
cross-strait reunification. The political basis for the peaceful development of 
cross-strait relations is the One China Principle. The method of realizing peaceful 
development between the two sides is through deepening cross-strait social and 
economic exchanges and cooperation by relying on the mass of the Taiwanese people.     
The peaceful development policy towards Taiwan puts forward the general plan of 
a common cross-strait destiny, and fully affirms the position and role of 
non-governmental forces from the perspective of cross-strait society. By constructing a 
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cross-strait cooperative mechanism, the mainland hopes to promote the formation of 
daily life connecting people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and gradually 
eliminating disputes among various ethnic groups on the two sides. More importantly, 
the mainland hopes to forge common historical memory and emotional condition on 
the basis of common life experiences between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese. 
Therefore, the cross-strait cooperative mechanism will provide a solid foundation for 
the collective identity between the two sides and the further development of cross-strait 
relations.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This thesis studies cross-strait economic interdependence and cross-strait relations 
and argues that there is an inherent interactive relationship between cross-strait 
economic interdependence and cross-strait political relations. This thesis views affairs 
from the angle of neoliberalist theory and interdependency theory. It also studies the 
basis of the developmental course of cross-strait economy and trade as well as 
cross-strait relations. In the past few chapters, this thesis has analyzed the interactive 
effect between the cross-strait economy and cross-strait relations, especially the 
political relations from many aspects with the signing of ECFA. The impact of Taiwan 
business people’s mainland investment is the other focus of this research. At the end 
of this thesis, it concludes that, on the one hand, the increase in cross-strait economic 
interdependence will promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On the 
other hand, stable cross-strait relations will also provide a policy guarantee and a 
peaceful scope for economic and trade development between mainland China and 
Taiwan.  
Engels once expressed the idea that political power is just the means used to realize 
economic interests (Li, 2010). Economic interests are the lifeblood of the survival of a 
country or region and its development foundation. Although cross-strait political 
relations cannot simply boil down to the influence of economic factors, the general 
trend is that maintaining normal economic and trade relations with the mainland is very 
important for Taiwan. As a non-economic factor, cross-strait relations which influence 
investors’ confidence in Taiwan cannot be overlooked. In order to retain its legitimacy, 
any Taiwanese political party, irrespective of whether the KMT or the DPP, has to 
consider the Taiwanese people’s common interests which are closely related to the 
increasing cross-strait economic exchanges. Therefore, it may be claimed that 
cross-strait economic and trade relations are a force countering Taiwan separatist forces. 
According to the scholar Wang Jianmin, the development of cross-strait economic and 
trade relations is a beneficial mechanism for maintaining the framework of cross-strait 
peace and stability (Wang, 2009). Without the beneficial foundation of cross-strait 
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economic exchanges and cooperation, cross-strait peaceful development is only a 
political slogan, and cannot stand as the operating mechanism for future cross-strait 
relations.   
The deduction that both sides across the Taiwan Strait will gradually establish tacit 
understanding and consensus with deepening cross-strait economic cooperation and 
development is a rather facile one. Therefore cross-strait political opposition will be 
resolved on the basis of mutual trust. In the past 30 years since the end of the Cold War, 
and against the backdrop of economic globalization and regional economic integration, 
all countries in the world with differing social systems and ideologies may weaken the 
contentions that spur ideological confrontations, cooperate with others and create 
multi-win situations for the purpose of safeguarding their own benefits and seeking self 
development. Undoubtedly, the two sides across the Taiwan Strait which share the 
same ancestry can dissolve misunderstanding, eliminate estrangement, abandon enmity 
and end the state of hostility (Yu, 2009). Therefore, peace and stability will become the 
mainstream of future cross-strait relations. As to what the neorealist theory had to 
admit that ―in recent times, states often get more benefits by enhancing economic 
efficiency, cooperation and international division of labour other than war, imperialism 
and the exclusive economic form‖ (Gilpin, 1994, p.219).   
Cross-strait relation is one of the most important and sensitive issues in world 
politics today, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The healthy cross-strait 
development not only concerns peace and happiness of people from both sides across 
the Taiwan Strait, but also the security, stability and development of the Asia-Pacific 
region, the United States and even the whole world. If cross-strait relations are 
compared to a living organism, then in this organism, political relations are the 
framework and physique, economic and trade relations are the flesh and blood, 
cultural relations are the soul and skin, and cross-strait people, especially Taiwanese 
business people are the red blood cells which transport oxygen and nutrition for this 
organism.  
The past 60
 years’ course of trials and hardship of cross-strait relations have 
demonstrated that, without the guarantees of such a framework as political relations, 
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the flesh and blood economic and trade relations have nowhere to abide, and spiritual 
cultural relations can only exist in an unseen world. In return, in the absence of the 
flesh and blood of economic and trade relations, the framework of political relations 
can only be a skeleton. Fortunately, cross-strait economic and trade relations as well 
as political relations have developed remarkably since the late 1980s, and this 
organism of cross-strait relations is rapidly developing and becoming mature on 
account of its careful handling by cross-strait people and governments. Nowadays 
cross-strait relations are in the midst of a period of fast development motivated by 
economy and trade. How to strengthen its physique and to solve the cross-strait 
political issue smoothly are difficult problems which will test the wisdom of 
cross-strait people and statesmen, and which needs both sides to cooperate actively 
and participate jointly.  
In the cross-strait political and economic relations divergence exists, however 
cross-strait mutual dependence and security accord with the interests of people from 
both sides. People hope that the newborn entity of cross-strait relations will grow up 
strong and sturdy in the post-ECFA era. Certain encouraging developments should 
serve to bolster and validate this expectation, such as the cessation in recent years of 
provocative military manoeuvres in the vicinity and missile test firings into the straits, 
as well as increasing political liberalism in the PRC government, which, coupled with 
the resurgent economic might of the mainland, may serve to offer additional 
inducements for the Taiwanese to eschew their separatist tendencies and opt for 
reunification in the short term. However the situation eventually plays out, it is safe to 
assert that, absent some wholly unforeseeable event that triggers a renewed escalation 
of hostilities, the two sides across the Strait seem to be charting a convergent course 
that will eventually and ineluctably result in their economic and political union. 
Whether this occurs in the near or the long term will rest in the final analysis on the 
goodwill and sincerity of the two sides, and the willingness to compromise and adapt, 
the lack of which 60-odd years ago precipitated the rift that has dogged relations since, 
and which rested ultimately on the personal inflexibility and divergent world views of 
the two chief protagonists who divided China, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek. It is 
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up to their progeny – both political and genetic – to repair the damage that their 
intractability and mutual, personal antagonism wrought on the Chinese nation, a 
consummation which is both devoutly to be wished, and far, far too long overdue.  
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